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1.1 Case study and main ideas 
In the winter of 2013-2014, domestic tensions in Ukraine quickly evolved into a global 
impactful event. Starting as protests in Kyiv against then-president Yanukovych in 2013, the 
crisis eventually resulted in a war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula by Russia.1 In the following months and years, Eastern Ukraine became a focal 
point of geopolitical conflict between Russia and the Western world.2 One of the ways 
through which the European Union (EU) responded to the conflict was by implementing 
restrictive measures, often called sanctions. Its first implementation of sanctions in February 
2014 targeted individuals in Ukraine responsible for excessive police violence.3 The EU 
became, mostly in line with the US, especially vocal after a rapid flow of events resulting in 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea.4 In different phases, a part of the international community 
implemented sanctions against Russian individuals and against the Russian government in 
general. Initially, this started by excluding Russia from the G8.5 In response to the 
controversial referendum on the political status of Crimea, the EU started implementing more 
sanctions. One day after the referendum, on 17 March 2014, the Council of the European 
Union announced sanctions targeted towards Russian individuals.6 The strongest economic 
sanctions came into place in July 2014.7 In the months and years to come, the EU expanded 
and adjusted sanctions against Russia. As of 2021, almost all sanctions are still in place.8 The 
implementation of these sanctions meant a break with earlier foreign policy of the EU towards 
Russia. In earlier tensions involving Russia, EU leaders tried to avoid imposing sanctions to 
respond to the events.9 Apart from affecting Russia, the sanctions and counter-sanctions 
                                                     
1 Hanna Shelest, “After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia?” Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies 15, no. 2 (2015): 191-192. 
2 Wan Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis,” Journal of Politics and Law 8, no. 
2 (2015): 1. 
3 Laura Klompenhouwer, “EU stelt sancties in tegen Oekraïne, Witte Huis ‘verbolgen’ over geweld,” NRC 
Handelsblad, February 20, 2014, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/02/20/witte-huis-geschokt-door-geweld-tegen-
betogers-in-oekraine-a1427045. 
4 Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis,” 2. 
5 Viktor Szep, “New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy: the European Council orchestrates the 
restrictive measures imposed against Russia,” Journal of European Integration 42, no. 6 (2020): 857-858. 
6 “Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP” (L 78/16-21), Council of the European Union, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:078:0016:0021:EN:PDF. 
7 Viljar Veebel and Raul Markus, “Lessons from the EU-Russia Sanctions 2014-2015,” Baltic Journal of Law & 
Politics 8, no. 1 (2015): 175. 
8 “Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine,” General Secretariat of the Council, 
accessed January 30, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-
crisis/. 
9 Szep, “New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy,” 857-858. 
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following 2014 resulted in problems for European countries as well, which were for a large 
part economic difficulties. The impact of these sanctions on European countries was different 
depending on the place and sector.10 
 The differences in impact of the sanctions on individual member states highlight an 
important aspect of decision-making regarding the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). Since all EU countries must agree unanimously on upholding sanctions, how 
do individual countries perceive and exercise power when it comes to deciding on EU 
restrictive measures, and do they exercise power on a national or an EU-wide level?11 How do 
individual countries differ in their participation in sanctions policies, and what unites them? 
This study examines the role of individual countries in prolonging sanctions. It focuses 
specifically on small states, actors whose influence is often overlooked in studies on the CFSP 
that focus on the role of individual states. By comparing Finland and the Netherlands, the 
study examines both country-specific characteristics of dealing with sanctions, as well as 
stances of these countries towards European cooperation. It includes the ways different small 
countries perceive power in the persistence of sanctions regimes. The study finds that even 
though small countries tend to agree on prolonging sanctions, the way they deal with 
sanctions both domestically and internationally differs significantly. This is important in 
understanding what dynamics are behind the sanctions mechanism and that upholding them is 
not a self-evident centralized procedure. 
 
1.2 Theoretical embedding and research focus 
Restrictive measures have been a key policy tool in international relations for several decades. 
Within the EU, sanctions are part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which 
coordinates the way the EU responds to international challenges. Before the 1990s, 
international sanctions usually comprised trade embargoes. Later on, during the first decades 
of the EU, sanctions imposed by the EU became more and more “targeted”. These targeted 
sanctions focus on denying one or several individuals access to the EU and its financial 
institutions. While the EU initially followed sanctions implemented by United Nations (UN) 
resolutions, in the past two decades it has increasingly started adopting sanctions on its own 
                                                     
10 Marcin Szczepanski, “Briefing: Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over Ukraine conflict,” European 
Parliamentary Research Service PE 569.020 (2015): 3-7, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf.  
11 Juha Jokela, Niklas Helwig and Clara Portela, eds., Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy. Challenges and 
Responses in a Geopolitical Era (FIIA Report, 2020), 14. 
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initiative.12 A reason for the increase of EU sanctions beyond those of the UN is the EU’s 
focus on the promotion of human rights and democratization in its external relations. In 
addition, the development of the CFSP in the early 2000s made the EU’s foreign policy more 
centralized, with different policy decisions than those made previously by individual member 
states.13 The focus in this study is on sanctions imposed largely on the EU’s own initiative, 
implemented in a centralized manner. 
This work starts by elaborating upon the existing literature on sanctions, which 
includes setting up a framework through which the literature is used in the study following. It 
looks at the different dimensions explaining the logic of implementing and upholding 
sanctions. Since the start of the academic debate surrounding sanctions in the second half of 
the 20th century, research has in large focused on the effectiveness of sanctions. This research 
often overlaps with discussions on what the aims of sanctions really are. Official documents 
usually state that sanctions have the objective to change the behavior of targets, but the 
academic debate has gone beyond this in unraveling different layers of objectives and actors 
behind sanctions imposition and prolonging.14 
One of the most important works this study draws on is by Francesco Giumelli, 
connecting dimensions of power with different functions of sanctions regimes. Recognizing 
these different functions brings an understanding of how Dutch and Finnish politicians 
exercise power in upholding sanctions regimes. Giumelli divides the dimensions of power in 
sanctions regimes into coercing, constraining and signaling. When sanctions intend to make a 
target country do something that they otherwise would not do, sanctions coerce. Constraining 
ensures that certain intended steps by the target country do not take place, while sanctions are 
signaling when they prevent conflicts from arising in the first place.15 Countries also 
implement signaling sanctions to other countries beyond the targeted state, to provide a 
positive image for themselves as guardian of a certain global norm.16 Recognizing the 
distinction between coercing, constraining and signaling sanctions is valuable because it goes 
beyond an understanding of whether sanctions are effective and what direct objectives are 
connected to them; this distinction goes towards an understanding of the actual function of the 
                                                     
12 Jokela, Helwig and Portela, Sharpening EU Sanctions Policy, 11-13. 
13 Ian Anthony, “Sanctions applied by the European Union and the United Nations,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press 2002), 203-204; 210-212. 
14 Francesco Giumelli, Fabian Hoffmann and Anna Ksiazczakova, “The when, what, where and why of 
European Union sanctions,” European Security 30, no. 1 (2021): 3-4. 
15 Francesco Giumelli, Coercing, constraining and signalling. Explaining UN and EU sanctions after the Cold 
War (ECPR Press 2011), 1-3. 
16 Viljar Veebel and Raul Markus, “At the Dawn of a New Era of Sanctions: Russian-Ukrainian Crisis and 
Sanctions,” Orbis 60, no. 1 (2016): 130. 
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sanctions in place.17 It thus provides a better picture of the way sanctions regimes work in the 
Netherlands and Finland. 
This study first looks at international sanctions in general, but quickly shifts the focus 
to the role of individual member states in the EU sanctions mechanism. At first glance, each 
member state’s role in the mechanism seems significant: in both its implementation and 
prolonging, all EU member states must agree on the sanctions regime. When purely looking at 
the mechanism, the power surrounding its implementation seems equally divided among 
member states. Nevertheless, scholars such as Clara Portela et al. and Christopher Hill have 
noted that not every country is as influential in constructing and upholding sanctions as others 
are. In upholding EU sanctions on Russia, for example, the importance of German leadership 
in both spearheading the sanctions regime as well as mediating with Russia has been an 
important factor.18 In EU sanctions policy in general, scholars such as Hill and Lehne have 
noted the leadership of France, Germany and the UK as main drivers.19 Others, such as Szep, 
have highlighted the role of the European Council in implementing and upholding sanctions. 
According to Szep, the European Council uses upholding certain norms important for the EU 
as its main driver for sanctions.20 Despite the supposed leadership roles of the European 
Council and larger states, the construction and upholding of sanctions is a process between 
governments that involves the agreement of all the member states.21 In practice, this involves 
decision-making through the Council of the European Union, in which there is more emphasis 
on bargaining with individual member states’ interests in mind.22 The role of individual 
member states within this intergovernmental process, particularly smaller states with less 
influence, is the specific focus of this study. How are sanctions reflected within these member 
states and does this reflection differ from country to country? 
 Individual countries within the EU have different reasons to join sanctions regimes. 
Niklas Helwig and Matti Pesu describe that elements in the decision-making process on 
sanctions are strategic culture, economic factors, security concerns, history, and international 
pressure and norms. To analyze ways in which individual countries participate in sanctions 
                                                     
17 Giumelli, Coercing, constraining and signalling, 1-3. 
18 Clara Portela, Paulina Pospieszna, Joanna Skrzypczynska, and Dawid Walentek, “Consensus against all odds: 
explaining the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia,” Journal of European Integration 43, no. 6 (2021): 684-
686. 
19 Christopher Hill, “The Big Three and the High Representative,” in The EU Presence in International 
Organizations, eds. Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis (Routledge 2011), 90-92; Stefan Lehne, The 
Big Three in EU Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012), 1-2.  
20 Szep, “New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy,” 855-856. 
21 Paul M. Silva II and Zachary Selden, “Economic interdependence and economic sanctions: a case study of 
European Union sanctions on Russia,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33:2 (2020): 234-235. 
22 Szep, “New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy,” 862-863. 
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regimes, they state, “one must pay attention to a state’s general attitude towards sanctions as a 
policy instrument.”23 After this, a country’s position on a certain sanctions regime needs to be 
analyzed. Thirdly, the international environment can explain the decision to participate in a 
sanctions regime or to refrain from joining it. The process of deciding on the implementation 
and upholding of sanctions regimes thus includes different layers, in which individual 
countries each participate in different ways.24 Since the main purpose of this study is to unfold 
differences between countries in the EU in sanctions prolonging, the reasoning behind 
participating in sanctions regimes is important to understand. 
The role of individual countries is especially interesting in explaining the persistence 
of EU sanctions, since all countries have to agree unanimously on their prolonging. There is 
considerable scholarship focusing on how sanctions came into place, but the EU’s ability to 
uphold sanctions for years remains somewhat under the radar. In those sanctions imposed 
against Russia, Clara Portela et al. highlight the interaction between the European Council 
and domestic politics as particularly important in upholding the sanctions for more than seven 
years.25 They argue that the domestic and international dimension intertwine in drawing up 
and maintaining sanctions. Individual countries had to reinterpret and stretch the guiding 
principles for EU-Russia relations as set up by the EU. Within the EU member states, some 
argue for stricter sanctions, while others prefer milder sanctions. In maintaining consensus, 
Portela et al. note that domestic groups are important to take into account. ‘Strict’ states, 
which prefer to prolong sanctions regimes, include influential groups that are opposed to 
sanctions. Less strict states, which more quickly prefer the lifting of certain sanctions, have 
domestic groups lobbying for stricter sanctions. The processes of debating and justifying 
sanctions domestically thus matter in sanctions prolonging.26 
Especially in recent years, with a call for more power for national governments, 
smaller countries are an interesting focus of study. The choice between cooperating more 
closely or having greater autonomy from EU processes, among which are sanctions as well, is 
especially pressing for smaller states. According to Haugevik and Rieker, among others, the 
EU framework is important for their national security. Simultaneously, more integration is 
perceived as a threat to their national identity. Haugevik and Rieker claim that smaller states 
                                                     
23 Niklas Helwig and Matti Pesu, “EU Decision-making on Sanctions Regimes,” in Sharpening EU Sanctions 
Policy. Challenges and Responses in a Geopolitical Era, eds. Niklas Helwig, Juha Jokela, and Clara Portela 
(FIIA Report 2020), 95. 
24 Ibid., 95-96. 
25 Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds,” 683. 
26 Ibid., 683-695. 
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have a stronger preference for international cooperation than larger states. However, smaller 
countries can have different degrees of loyalty, autonomy and integration into the EU. In the 
upholding of sanctions regimes this makes that smaller countries can maintain very different 
interests.27 
To elucidate the dynamics of individual countries within EU restrictive measures, this 
study focuses on the role of two countries in upholding EU sanctions. Moving away from the 
literature concentrating on the role of large states as France and Germany, this study 
comprises a comparison between Finland and the Netherlands. Some scholars, such as 
Thorhallsson, classify the Netherlands and Finland as small states in the EU.28 These states, 
according to scholars such as Krotz & Maher, and Lehne, do not belong to the traditionally 
most important states in EU foreign policy.29 However, they do need to agree on prolonging 
sanctions in order for them to continue. Therefore, it is important to study more than solely 
the large and powerful EU states. To get a complete picture of how the EU imposes and 
prolongs sanctions, all member states need to be taken into account.30 For that reason, this 
study seeks to understand the specific role of the Netherlands and Finland in upholding EU 
sanctions. The main question this study answers is: In what ways do smaller countries in the 
EU differ from each other in their approach to the upholding of EU sanctions and how are 
these differences reflected on their participation in sanctions regimes and their attitudes 
towards European integration? 
To start understanding this main question, several sub-questions require answers. First, 
it is necessary to explain how the sanctions mechanism of the EU works. What are sanctions 
exactly? What are the official reasons for sanctions to be implemented and prolonged and 
how do these official reasons reflect reality? When moving away from the international layer 
of restrictive measures it is necessary to understand how individual countries can differ in 
their approach to sanctions regimes. Do small countries consider sanctions to be a tool of 
coercing, constraining or signaling, or do they use sanctions differently? Do small states use 
the sanctions mechanism as a tool for closer European cooperation, or are sanctions used by 
individual countries as a way to enhance intergovernmentalism? Do domestic reasons play a 
                                                     
27 Kristin Haugevik and Pernille Rieker, “Autonomy or integration? Small-state responses to a changing 
European security landscape,” Global Affairs 3, no. 3 (2017): 211-219. 
28 Baldur Thorhallsson, “Small States in the UNSC and the EU: Structural Weaknesses and Ability to Influence,” 
in Small states in a legal world, eds. P. Butler and C. Morris (Springer International Publishing AG 2017), 44. 
29 Stefan Lehne, The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 2012), 1-2; Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “Europe’s crises and the EU’s ‘big three’,” West European 
Politics 39, no. 5 (2016): 1053-1055. 




large role in prolonging sanctions, or is the international level much more important? In 
answering these questions, the results of this study reflect different dimensions. First, the 
results add something to the debate surrounding the role of individual countries in the CFSP 
in general. Second, the study outlines characteristics specific to the EU sanctions on Russia. It 
provides a new perspective on the sanctions against Russia by focusing specifically on the 
role of individual countries in prolonging them. This is important, because the sanctions have 
been in place for several years without much perspective of lifting them. The overarching 
goal of this study is to answer questions relating to the first dimension: how do individual 
countries, especially small countries, utilize the sanctions mechanism within the CFSP? This 
study offers new insight into some of the factors affecting decisions of small states in 
sanctions, offering an important step forward in terms of understanding decision-making 
within the CFSP. 
 
1.3 Research material and relevance 
This study compares parliamentary documents from Finland and the Netherlands by using 
Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). The documents under study provide a variety of 
opinions including both governmental stances and opposition’s viewpoints in both Finland 
and the Netherlands. All documents stem from 2016. This year is interesting to understand the 
prolonging of sanctions for several reasons. First, all EU sanctions were prolonged in this 
year. Second, it became clear that previous international agreements for solving the conflict 
were not having their hoped effect. In March 2015, the EU aligned the lifting of sanctions to 
the implementation of the so-called Minsk agreements, to which both Ukraine and Russia did 
not comply at the end of 2015. Therefore, sanctions were prolonged despite earlier hopes for 
lifting them by 2016. Third, the conflict in Ukraine was somewhat calm in 2016, causing little 
reason for entirely new sanctions to be implemented.31 
The parliamentary documents studied here cannot provide a complete picture of how 
sanctions are reflected within countries. They nevertheless reflect a range of opinions within 
the country, even when the conflict was not anymore reaching the headlines on a daily basis. 
For that reason, analyzing parliamentary documents is more useful than, for example, 
newspapers. While newspapers play a significant role in public perception and public 
attention for foreign affairs, they are limited in their ability to give a full picture of foreign 
                                                     
31 General Secretariat of the Council, “Timeline – EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine.” 
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policy.32 The approach in this study is thus not to understand exactly how the public perceives 
foreign policy in Finland and the Netherlands, but rather how the political debate in these 
countries regarding sanctions might differ. This is important, because the standpoint of the 
political elite is one of the main actors in determining a country’s position in EU sanctions 
regimes.33  
In understanding how sanctions are discussed in national politics, QCA is an effective 
method. The method is flexible in analyzing large text data, which is helpful when comparing 
textual data that spans over a certain period of time. It makes it possible to draw attention to 
the content of the articles, while also putting it into context. This study follows a roadmap for 
conducting QCA developed by Margrit Schreier that involves a pilot, main coding and 
analysis phase.34 In drawing up the coding frame, this study uses conventional content 
analysis, which describes certain phenomena. It also uses directed content analysis, which 
uses existing theoretical conceptions to build a coding frame.35 The data used in the QCA is 
divided into five dimensions, which each cover a part of the main research questions in this 
study. 
 Apart from shifting the focus away from the most populous countries in the EU, 
comparing the Netherlands and Finland is useful for several other reasons. Looking at 
economic factors, both countries have often expressed similar interests in EU cooperation.36 
For example, the voting behavior of both countries in the EU regarding European integration 
is similar.37 In population size, the Netherlands is significantly bigger than Finland, with 
around 17.4 million people compared to around 5.5 million in 2020. Within the EU, this 
brings both countries somewhat in the middle, not having the power that for example France 
and Germany have.38 Multiple scholars have described countries such as the Netherlands and 
Finland as small countries in the EU. The Netherlands is for example a small state with “a 
strong preference for cooperation at the European level”.39 Finland, similarly, is a small 
                                                     
32 Stuart Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” Press/Politics 8, no. 1 (2003): 42-43. 
33 Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds,” 687. 
34 Margrit Schreier, Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012), 5-7. 
35 Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” Qualitative Health 
Research 15, no. 9 (2005): 1279-1283. 
36 Daniel F. Schuld and Thomas Henökl, “New Alliances in Post-Brexit Europe: Does the New Hanseatic 
League Revive Nordic Political Cooperation?” Politics and Governance 8, no. 4 (2020): 84-85. 
37 Lewis Dijkstra, Hugo Poelman, and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, “The geography of EU discontent,” Regional 
Studies 54, no. 6 (2020): 739. 
38 “Living in the EU,” European Union, accessed January 30, 2021, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/figures/living_en. 
39 Steven Blockmans, “The Benelux approach to EU integration and external action,” Global Affairs (2017): 11. 
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country supporting and promoting the “common institutional and normative framework of the 
Union and the community-centered orientation of its power structures”.40 
Despite noticeable similarities in general policy preferences in the EU, the Netherlands 
and Finland are also quite different in its foreign policy. The relationship with Russia, for 
example, is different in both countries. Russia used to be the largest trading partner of Finland 
until the tensions in Ukraine broke out.41 While not being the most important anymore, Russia 
remains a significant trading partner.42 Besides being a long-term trading partner, Finland 
shares 1300 kilometers of land border with Russia and has had relatively close political 
relations with Russia throughout the past decades.43 The Netherlands, on the other hand, is 
less reliant on Russia in its trade and is historically and geographically not as close to Russia. 
In economic relations, the only exception to this rule are imports of mineral fuels.44 Certain 
events also deserve attention when analyzing the Dutch way of dealing with EU sanctions. In 
relation to Russia, this especially concerns the downing of flight MH17, which eventually led 
to a third phase of sanctions on Russia imposed by the EU.45 Most victims on board of this 
plane were Dutch, which undoubtedly affected the country’s relationship with Russia.46 
 Besides the specific characteristics of the Netherlands and Finland that make this study 
interesting, this research is important due to the lack of diverse country comparisons in 
research of the EU’s CFSP. In-depth comparisons between the Netherlands and Finland 
regarding their participation in the sanctions mechanism of the EU are, to the best of my 
knowledge, currently non-existent. There have been case studies to explain the persistence of 
EU sanctions on Russia, for example by Portela, Pospieszna, Skrzypczynska & Walentek, 
who compared Spain and Poland.47 Others, such as Siddi, have put the emphasis on 
Germany’s leadership during the construction of sanctions against Russia.48 Comparisons 
between two small EU countries are difficult because of the lack of mutual expertise between 
                                                     
40 Teija Tiilikainen, “Finland – An EU Member with a Small state Identity,” European Integration 28, no. 1 
(2006): 79. 
41 “Finnish exports to Russia down more than 35 percent,” YLE, last modified July 8, 2016, accessed February 1, 
2021, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/finnish_exports_to_russia_down_more_than_35_percent/8251837. 
42 “Kauppa,” Tilastokeskus, last modified March 15, 2021, accessed March 17, 2021, 
https://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_kotimaankauppa.html. 
43 Tobias Etzold & Hiski Haukkala, “Is There a Nordic Russia Policy? Swedish, Finnish and Danish Relations 
with Russia in the Context of the European Union,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19, no. 2: 252-
255. 
44 Wiel Packbier, Internationale handel in goederen van Nederland 2012 (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
(CBS), 2013), 14. 
45 Szep, “New intergovernmentalism meets EU sanctions policy,” 859-861. 
46 “Vlucht MH17,” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, accessed February 28, 2021, https://mh17tijdlijn.nl. 
47 Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds.” 
48 Marco Siddi, “A Contested Hegemon? Germany’s Leadership in EU Relations with Russia.” German Politics 
29, no. 1 (2018): 97-114. 
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both countries: in the Netherlands, for example, it is since 2013 not possible anymore to study 
Finnish on an academic level.49 The specific choice for comparing Finland and the 
Netherlands has for a large part to do with both the political and language knowledge of the 
author. I understand Dutch fluently and I am an advanced user of Finnish, following both 
countries closely over the past years. Therefore, the translations in this study are my own. 
 Chapter 2 starts by setting up a theoretical framework, which makes it possible to 
analyze the sanctions of the EU on Russia. It begins by going deeper into the definition of 
sanctions, and explain what EU sanctions actually are. To understand the case study better, a 
section providing context for EU sanctions on Russia follows next. Once the definition and 
context of sanctions is clear, the theoretical part goes deeper into the general power relations 
in sanctions. This involves an analysis of the concept of sanctions as coercing, constraining 
and signaling, with the aim of highlighting different objectives states can have to impose or 
prolong sanctions. Other theory regarding the ultimate aim of sanctions is under consideration 
in this section as well. The second part of the theory, starting from section 2.2, concerns the 
role of individual countries in the foreign policy of the EU. This part also puts focus on EU 
integration theory, which helps in explaining how individual countries use the sanctions 
mechanism. The section starts by outlining general theory regarding the role of individual 
countries, after which it touches upon theory about “small” countries. 
 Once the theoretical framework has been set out, the study moves towards the QCA of 
Dutch and Finnish parliamentary documents. Chapter 3 starts by a discussion on the use of 
QCA, followed by a section explaining how the framework of this study came into place. This 
includes outlining the research design and a description of the coding frame used. Following 
this, chapter 4 presents the results of the QCA. The last part of this study, chapter 5, contains 
the discussion section drawing the data and theory together. In conclusion, I will show that 
while individual countries present themselves as being united in the larger framework of the 




                                                     




2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Theory and operation of sanctions 
2.1.1 Defining sanctions 
Restrictive measures have been part of the academic debate from a plethora of different 
perspectives. These perspectives range from expectations of how sanctions operate, to 
underlying factors in the decision-making process of sanctions, to the role of individual states 
in sanctions regimes and foreign policy in general. Theorizing sanctions generally starts by 
looking at the power dynamics behind sanctions, which includes the expected operation of 
sanctions.50 After defining what we understand as “sanctions” or “restrictive measures”, this 
study moves to exploring these power dynamics by comparing several theories that have been 
leading in the study of sanctions in the past decades. Next, it focuses on theory of sanctions as 
coercing, constraining and signaling. To make it possible to study the participation of 
individual countries in sanctions, the second part of the theory focuses on individual countries 
and their role in the wider framework of sanctions.  
 The groundwork of the academic debate on restrictive measures was set up in the 
second half of the twentieth century. It is complicated to determine exactly what “sanctions” 
or “restrictive measures” mean, because sanctions have been discussed from a wide range of 
perspectives. In the early academic debate on international sanctions, most focus was put on 
the role of economic sanctions. These economic sanctions, according to James Barber, “are 
economic measures directed to political objectives”.51 The economic measures are usually 
accompanied by other restrictions, which for example restrict diplomatic and cultural ties. 
According to Barber, economic measures sometimes are an addition to the use of force, but 
these two do not necessarily go hand in hand.52 
Johan Galtung, one of the most influential scholars in theorizing sanctions and their 
functions, included in his definition of sanctions a slightly more clear-cut idea of what 
sanctions are and included in his definition also a general objective of sanctions. According to 
him, sanctions are 
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actions initiated by one or more international actors (the “senders”) against one or more others (the 
“receivers”) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some 
value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important.53 
 
According to Galtung, it is not necessarily logical that sanctions serve both purposes directly. 
He noted that punishment is in general not a good method for making others comply. 
Therefore, it is more important to look at which purpose is more important, than assuming 
that both purposes are directly in place.54 Others, such as Hufbauer et al., define sanctions as 
“the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade 
or financial relations”.55 Much of the literature concerning sanctions focuses on economic 
sanctions, instead of focusing on sanctions in general. Nevertheless, sanctions can differ 
greatly in scope: they can be for example through political, diplomatic, sectoral, or individual 
measures.56 Many definitions of economic sanctions are also applicable to international 
sanctions in general. Just as economic sanctions, international sanctions in general are “geared 
to ‘exercising pressure’ with a view to ‘producing a change in the political behavior of 
another actor’”.57 Scholars have also noted that sanctions are imposed as a response to “illegal 
or politically undesirable acts”.58 Thus, the basic idea of what a sanction is stays similar 
regardless of whether the sanction is economic or constituting a different focus. 
What the different definitions share is that sanctions are a mechanism creating a 
different situation than the relationship between the sender and receiver once was. Economic 
sanctions are portrayed as an “exceptional measure”, being the “antithesis” of normal foreign 
economic policy.59 Other restrictive measures often complement economic sanctions. This 
concerns for example diplomatic measures. As a general definition for sanctions, it is thus 
important to not solely focus on the economic mechanisms behind sanctions. As a broader 
definition of sanctions, this study uses a definition proposed by Portela et al., who describe 
sanctions as  
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the politically-motivated withdrawal of a benefit that would otherwise be granted, and whose restoration 
is made dependent on the fulfilment of a series of conditions defined by the sender.60  
 
This definition not only considers sanctions as restrictions being imposed by the sender, but 
also connects sanctions to certain conditions. Sanctions are in theory thus not purely reactive, 
but also provide an opportunity to be lifted again. This characteristic of sanctions is important 
for this study, because it means that renewing sanctions is not the self-evident way to go.  
 
2.1.2 Sanctions in the EU 
The EU has implemented a wide variety of sanctions, which can be divided into roughly three 
different types of sanctions. The sanctions have, according to Portela and Biersteker, different 
“embeddedness” in the international context. First, the EU implements sanctions that are 
agreed upon by the UN. These sanctions are a direct result of UN Security Council (UNSC) 
decisions; the EU does not have any observable role in these sanctions. Second, the EU 
autonomously decides upon sanctions that go further than UN sanctions. In other words, the 
EU implements “supplementary measures” in addition to sanctions instated by the UNSC. 
Third, the EU implements sanctions without any sanction decision made by the UNSC. This 
happens for example when the UNSC does not agree on a sanctions package. These sanctions 
are the most autonomous of all three types applied by the EU. This last category does not 
necessarily mean, however, that these sanctions come into place completely autonomously. 
These sanctions are often in line with sanctions implemented by the United States, but are 
usually not completely the same. The sanctions package of the EU on Russia falls in the third 
category.61 In the past, the US often led the way in designing sanctions in which the EU 
participated, even when the EU regularly adopted sanctions that were more modest in scope. 
In recent years, however, there is a visible divergence between the EU and US sanctions 
policies. This predominantly has to do with a change in US sanctions policies, which have 
become more aggressive. The main diverging factor is the use of secondary sanctions by the 
US. These sanctions target companies in third countries that work together with entities under 
US sanctions. This policy change has large consequences for companies in the EU, who 
regularly cooperate with entities under US sanctions. This development means that the EU 
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acts more autonomously than before with regard to sanctions, even though the influence of 
the US should not be underestimated.62 
 The basis for the current procedures in the EU for implementing and prolonging 
sanctions have been the Guidelines on the Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive 
Measures (Sanctions) (hereafter the Guidelines) and the Basic Principles of the Use of 
Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) (hereafter the Principles) of respectively 2003 and 2004.63 
As stated in the Principles, the EU implements autonomous sanctions “in support of efforts to 
fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and (…) to uphold 
respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance”.64 These 
principles are still the formal objectives of EU sanctions. Other documents attempting to 
optimize the implementation of EU sanctions complement the Principles.65 The Guidelines, 
renewed in 2018, state that sanctions “are imposed by the EU to bring about a change in 
policy or activity by the target country, part of country, government, entities or individuals”.66 
Lastly, the Best Practices on Effective Implementation of Financial Restrictive Measures are 
important in the way the EU implements sanctions. These documents all make that EU 
sanctions are centrally legalized. However, implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions 
is decentralized and thus in the hands of member states.67 
 Thus, when looking at the general definition of sanctions in combination with EU 
sanctions, the politically motivated withdrawal of a benefit is in the EU the withdrawal of a 
benefit based on reasons concerning terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance as described in the Principles. This focus is 
combined with conditions in the Guidelines, which show that sanctions can be implemented 
against different entities. This means that sanctions can work against states, but on a smaller 
individual level as well. 
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2.1.3 EU sanctions on Russia and their effects on the Netherlands and Finland 
The sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 concern different types of sanctions. The imposition 
of sanctions started in March 2014, by introducing asset freezes and travel restrictions to 
Russian and Ukrainian individuals. In addition, several bilateral negotiations about for 
example visa procedures were suspended.68 The EU decided unanimously on these sanctions, 
even when several countries noted that sanctions would have a negative economic impact on 
EU member states. In disputes with somewhat symmetrical power relations, which is the case 
between the EU and Russia, sanctions are generally harmful to both sides. A strong 
interdependency characterizes the relationship, making the potential for mutual harm high.69 
In April, May, and July 2014, EU sanctions on Russia were widened in scope. The 
strongest economic sanctions came into place in July 2014, when the EU introduced sector-
specific sanctions against the Russian military industry, as well as its financial and energy 
sector. Initially, conditions to lift the sanctions were relatively vague, while reasons for 
implementing sanctions were clearer; the main reasons for implementing and expanding were 
the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the persistence of Russian-supported 
separatist military pressure in East Ukraine.70 The downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-
17A on 17 July 2014 caused a strong tightening to the sanctions already in place, due to 
suspected Russian involvement in the shooting of this airplane.71 In the following months, 
new decisions by the EU widened the sanctions in place, but the main idea about the type of 
sanctions did not change. Official conditions to lift the sanctions became clearer in the 
following months, in which the EU called for the removal of armed forces in Eastern Ukraine 
in accordance with the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet 
stationing on the territory of Ukraine of 1997.72 The EU regularly reviews its sanctions; 
economic sanctions, asset freezes and travel bans require unanimous support from all EU 
members every six months. Within the EU, there are also annual reviews related to measures 
in place against entities on Crimea.73 
 EU sanctions received a response from the Russian side. Countermeasures followed 
the sanctions implemented by the EU at almost every round of sanctions implementation or 
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prolonging. In March 2014, measures were implemented against high-ranked officials of the 
EU and EU member states. In August 2014, Russia started an embargo on imports of many 
agricultural products, which impacted all countries that adopted economic sanctions against 
Russia. Besides the EU, this included the United States, Norway, Canada and Australia.74 
Thus, EU sanctions alone are not the only cause of noticeable sanction impacts on the EU and 
Russia; Russian countermeasures play a significant role as well. 
 It is important to note that, as it comes to the impact of sanctions on individual EU 
member states, sanctions did not affect every country in the EU proportionally. In 2015, seven 
out of the 28 EU countries suffered net losses.75 At the same time, some economic sectors in 
the EU did in fact increase their exports to Russia after the implementation of sanctions. As a 
whole, however, exports from the EU to Russia decreased after 2014.76 The impact of the 
sanctions on trade between the EU and Russia strongly depends on the sector, which also 
partly explains why sanctions affect different countries economically in different ways. One 
of the most important sectors is the agricultural sector, of which exports from the EU to 
Russia dropped in 2016 by 52.6% compared to 2013 levels, almost completely due to the 
sanctions.77 In addition, the collapse of oil prices and depreciation of the Russian ruble have 
also affected exports to Russia.78 
 In February 2015, against a backdrop of clashes, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, 
France and Germany developed the “Minsk II” agreement with the long-term goal of bringing 
an enduring peace to the eastern parts of Ukraine.79 The agreement, which the rest of this 
study refers to as the Minsk agreement, gave temporary self-autonomy to the regions of 
Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, it set out that all foreign troops 
should leave Ukraine, as well as the disarming of all illegal armed groups.80 Soon after 
signing the agreement, the EU decided to tie the implementation of the Minsk agreement to 
the sanctions in place against Russia. The full implementation of the agreement became a 
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condition for lifting the sanctions.81 Interestingly, despite support of the EU for not 
recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and for supporting a UN resolution on the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine, the Minsk agreement does not make any reference to Crimea.82 
According to the official readings, EU sanctions on Russia are still tied to the implementation 
of the Minsk II agreement.83 
As this study focuses on Finland and the Netherlands, it is especially useful to shed 
more light on the impact of the sanctions on these countries. Finland, having close ties to 
Russia, was one of the seven countries in the EU suffering net losses after implementing the 
sanctions.84 According to Giumelli, when looking at several economic factors, Finland is 
among the countries in the EU hardest hit by sanctions, along with countries such as Germany 
and Italy. In some sectors, Finland suffered the hardest losses of all EU countries with regard 
to exports.85 In the case of Finland, the hardest impact on its economy is not due to the 
sanctions packages of the EU on Russia, which hardly affected Finnish trade. The Russian 
countermeasures as a result of EU sanctions, however, affected Finland strongly. The 
sanctioned agricultural sector that was strongly tied to Russia, especially as it comes to dairy 
and meat industries, suffered a great blow from sanctions.86 
The sanctions and countermeasures did affect the Netherlands as well. While not being 
the country economically most affected by the sanctions, its exports to Russia decreased by 
39% in 2015 compared to 2013.87 Just as in Finland, the agricultural sector especially suffered 
strongly. The export of the agricultural sector almost halved in 2015 compared to 2013.88 
However, as total share of the agricultural exports in 2015, Russia accounts for less than 2%. 
Therefore, the economic impact is not as large in the Netherlands as in Finland.89  
Despite the negative economic impact of sanctions, it is important to note that a strong 
economic impact does not necessarily explain sanctions decisions made in EU countries. As 
Giumelli argues, some countries that have suffered relatively little in economic terms, for 
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example Greece, are very critical about the sanctions. On the other hand, countries such as 
Germany that suffered more are strong supporters of sanctions.90 
 
2.1.4 Different logics on the operation of sanctions 
In order to shift the focus to the level of individual member states in sanctions, it is first 
important to understand in what ways sanctions operate. When sanctions are implemented, 
different mechanisms are in place. These mechanisms together make that an eventual 
sanctions package is put into force. First, this theoretical part focuses on the mechanisms 
behind sanctions packages in general. This means that the focus is on how sanctions are 
expected to operate, and what different goals sanctions can have. After that, the study focuses 
on the theory behind the role of individual countries in constituting and prolonging sanctions 
mechanisms. 
 Important in sanctions theory is the impact of sanctions on the economy of both the 
sender and the receiver. Some scholars have conceptualized the mechanism as a form of 
international bargaining. When implemented, from the sender’s perspective some sort of 
uncertainty exists regarding the receiver’s willingness and ability to deal with the restrictions 
in place. This does not mean that sanctions are only draining on the end of the receivers: both 
senders and receivers have to bear costs for the sanctions in place.91 The costs of sanctions 
increase if the degree of interdependence between the sender and the receiver is high. The 
sanctions of the EU on Russia are a good example of a sanctions package that affects both 
sides economically, as described in the previous section.92 A logic to explain the 
implementation of sanctions despite economic losses on both sides is the traditional idea of 
“more pain, more gain”. According to this theory, enough pressure on a receiver drains the 
economy of it to such an extent, that the situation becomes too difficult. The most natural 
reaction of the receiving end of sanctions would be, according to this theory, to comply.93  
From the liberal point of view on international relations, countries that have strong 
economic ties are less likely to impose economic sanctions on each other. This can be 
explained by the logic of interdependence: sanctions would disrupt not only the economy of 
the receiving entity, but also that of the senders. In the EU, this logic would mean that 
individual countries have different attitudes to imposing sanctions that affect the economy. In 
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the case of Russia, for example, EU states differ strongly in their economic interdependence 
with Russia. The logic of interdependence would make that states with closer economic ties to 
Russia are more likely to oppose these sanctions.94 This theory does not exclude the pain-gain 
logic. Instead, the logic of interdependence supposes that the pain is felt on both sides. 
Because of this, potential senders might decide that the mutual pain is not worth the gain. 
Presumably, there is as well a balance for sending states between the economic pain suffered 
from interdependence and the eventual normative gain from encouraging a receiver to change 
its behavior. Section 2.2.1 considers these normative reasons in more detail. 
While the role of economics is important in sanctions, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that economic concerns are not the only or even main driver for senders when implementing 
and upholding sanctions.95 As described by Giumelli, for example, the economic impact of 
sanctions does not explain the behavior of different countries in constructing and upholding 
the EU sanctions on Russia.96 Besides economic sanctions, some scholars state that security 
concerns play a large role in constituting sanctions.97 In the end, one of the main reasons to 
implement sanctions is as an alternative to the use of armed force, or at least as a way to 
postpone the use of military interference.98 Such an armed conflict would usually be, from an 
economic point of view, devastating to both the sender and receiver.99 Thus, while it is useful 
to keep an eye on the economic interdependence of countries in analyzing how sanctions are 
implemented and upheld, other factors than purely economic ones are expected to play a role 
in sanctions mechanisms. 
Related to the pain-gain theory on the effect of sanctions is the “naïve theory” of 
sanctions, proposed first by Johan Galtung and adopted by many after.100 According to 
Galtung, sanctions are usually expected to make receiving entities comply to the will of the 
senders. Included in this idea is that if a receiver experiences economic losses, political 
disintegration will take place. This political disintegration in turn means that receivers of 
sanctions will comply, in order to keep public opinion on their side. However, this idea 
ignores the principle of adaptation: receivers can adapt to the situation and once this is done, 
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political disintegration does not take place.101 It could even be that sanctions cause political 
integration in the receiving country. This is caused by what is called the “rally-around-the-
flag” effect: the people of the receiving entity unite, while the animosity towards the sending 
entities grows. Some argue that the rally-around-the-flag effect is an important reason why 
sanctions do not work as expected.102 Galtung considers many sanctions thus as “naïve”, 
because instead of reaching compliance they might cause the opposite. 
The naïve theory initially theorized the operation of economic sanctions. However, it 
also applies to other types of sanctions. Targeted sanctions, for example, do not necessarily 
bring direct economic harm. The naïve theory is nevertheless still applicable; the idea of 
getting “political gain through economic pain” is substituted by a similar theory of “political 
gain through nauseating the powerful”.103 In other words, the logic of the naïve theory of 
economic sanctions also applies to other types of sanctions. The only difference is that the 
theory then applies on a more specific level, for example on an individual scale.104 In the case 
of this study, the naïve theory is relevant because it shows that senders do not always control 
how sanctions are received. In studying sanctions prolonging, then, it is useful to consider this 
theory because the prolonging-related objectives of individual countries might change from 
their initial aims when countries start to experience the unexpected effects of sanctions. 
 As becomes clear from the theory discussed above, sanctions do not solely serve one 
clear-cut goal and do not cause one clear effect. As the naïve theory shows, sanctions that are 
in place do often not reach the goal of compliance, which could influence the decision for 
states to participate in certain sanctions regimes. In addition, while the economic influence of 
sanctions should not be underestimated, it is necessary to keep a wider array of explanations 
for the upholding of sanctions in place than purely economic explanations. As for objectives, 
an influential theory by James Barber proposes to divide objectives of sanctions into primary, 
secondary and tertiary objectives. He notes that objectives are not solely related to changes in 
behavior of the receiver to whom the sanctions are directed; in reality, a diversity of 
considerations needs to be taken into account when studying the objectives of sanctions.105 
 Barber divides these in primary, secondary, and tertiary objectives. Primary objectives 
are related to the behavior and actions of the entity against whom the sanctions are 
implemented. Secondary sanctions concern the sending entities: this mainly concerns their 
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international status, but also their behavior and expectations. Tertiary objectives of sanctions 
are broader, international considerations. These objectives relate to the structure and operation 
of the international system.106 Separating these objectives is useful in demonstrating that 
sanctions are driven by different policy objectives, which can be studied simultaneously but 
can also be separated. This separation is especially useful when trying to answer why certain 
sanctions are in place, since it shows the complex process of sanctions imposition and 
upholding.107 
 
2.1.5 Signaling, Constraining, and Coercing 
As discussed in the previous section, the basic theory around sanctions focuses strongly on 
the way sanctions work in reaching policy objectives. This study uses this theory to analyze 
the way Finland and the Netherlands prolong sanctions regimes. The “more pain, more gain 
theory”, for example, is useful in analyzing narratives from both parliaments. Dividing 
primary, secondary and tertiary objectives also helps in understanding how these different 
dimensions are expressed in sanctions policy. 
 However, to get a fuller understanding of the way sanctions function, it is necessary to 
go beyond identifying whether sanctions work and what different objectives they have. While 
certain factors, such as the economic impact, are important to take into account, it is difficult 
to assess precisely whether sanctions have been successful. Measuring what would have been 
different without the sanctions remains almost impossible.108 An often-used way that goes 
beyond understanding the less flexible pain-gain logic and the goal-driven approach is by 
dividing the operation of sanctions into coercing, constraining, and signaling. This division 
has been put forward by Francesco Giumelli, and is used by many as a way to go beyond the 
pure ability of sanctions to coerce targets.109 It thus brings a more holistic understanding of 
the logic behind sanctions. 
 To understand these different divisions, it is first necessary to understand that 
sanctions include different dimensions of power. Power theory has been widely discussed in 
the academic world, with Steven Lukes three-dimensional theory of power being one of the 
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most influential ones.110 Lukes criticizes in his three dimensions the one-dimensional 
definition of power proposed by Robert Dahl, often called the ‘pluralist’ view of power.111 In 
this definition, Dahl describes his idea of power as “A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do.”112 Lukes criticizes this definition 
in that it focuses too much on behavior, which fails to take into account how the political 
agenda is controlled. In many cases, the use of power is more complex and results from 
mechanics beyond Dahl’s definition of power.113  
In Lukes’ three dimensions of power, the first dimension relates closely to Dahl’s 
definition. In the first place, power can be used in a way that A makes B do something which 
B would not do without the exercise of power. In other words, this type of power is a 
decision-making power, in which A prevails over B.114 Power can also make sure that certain 
decisions are not taken in the first place, concerns the second dimension. This has been called 
the “agenda-setting power” or “non-decision-making power”.115 The last dimension of power 
prevents conflicts from arising and is a “thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus” of 
the former two dimensions.116 This dimension refers to some sort of ideological power, and 
causes that “potential issues are kept out of politics”.117 This kind of power, according to 
Giumelli, “shapes the interests and the knowledge of the actors”.118 In other words, the last 
dimension of power has some sort of ideological characteristic. 
 The dimensions of power relate directly to the role sanctions can play in international 
relations. Coercing sanctions relate to the first kind of power. When implemented, they 
attempt the receiver to change its behavior. It causes damage to the receiver and creates 
incentives to the receiver to implement certain changes. The essence of coercion is in having 
realistic demands to the receiver; the receiver knows what to do in order to make the sanctions 
stop.119 Coercing sanctions include some sort of penalty or a threat of penalties: without these, 
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they do not live up to the realistic demands. As a result, the sanctions lose their coercive 
elements.120 
 The second dimension of power is connected to the constraining characteristic that 
sanctions can have. In contrast to coercing sanctions, the goal in constraining is not for 
senders to make receivers do something specific. Instead, constraining attempts to stop the 
possibilities of receivers to implement new policies. Constraining sanctions come into effect 
when the interests of senders and receivers cannot coincide. Giumelli describes this as a zero-
sum game context, which “determines the resilience of targets and the determination of 
senders”. He notes that these sanctions are often in place when entities do not conform to the 
norms used by the international society.121 This “international society”, however, can also 
mean a part of the international society. As described before, it rarely happens that the 
complete international society implements sanctions because of a breach of a common norm. 
For example, the UN General Assembly condemned the referendum on Crimea as 
illegitimate, but not all countries chose to implement sanctions because of this decision.122 
 The last type of sanctions distinguished by Giumelli are signaling sanctions. These 
sanctions are the most abstract type of sanctions; they are aiming to send a signal that the 
sender will not tolerate certain behavior. Signaling sanctions do not create direct damage to a 
receiver.123 The receivers of signaling sanctions can be the whole international community, 
but can also be certain states, non-governmental entities and individuals. Signaling sanctions 
are, for example, used as a tool in a “communication war”; they shape a certain standard, 
which can be aimed at creating a stigma around receivers.124 Signaling sanctions often show 
that there are certain red lines, or norms, in international relations. Some have also considered 
signaling sanctions as “symbolic” sanctions, because they do not have a directly visible 
effect.125 Thus, signaling sanctions are a norm-setting, preventive way of using sanctions. 
 In the analysis of the QCA in this study, these distinctions help in analyzing how two 
individual countries differ or coincide in upholding the same set of sanctions. This work thus 
analyzes which types of power are identifiable in the attitudes of Finland and the Netherlands 
in upholding the sanctions against Russia. While the main point of this study is to compare 
how different individual countries behave, it also places this behavior in the wider context of 
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how the EU uses this power. In addition, the QCA makes it possible to identify how the 
countries use the other mechanisms present in sanctions theory. 
 
2.2 Individual countries and “small” states 
So far, the theoretical part of this study focused on general theory concerning the objectives 
and expected operations of international sanctions. To get a full picture of the way individual 
countries behave in these mechanisms, it is necessary to zoom in on individual countries and 
sanctions as well. This section concentrates on the way individual countries operate within 
wider institutions, such as the EU. Since the Netherlands and Finland have been described as 
“smaller” countries within the EU, this section also focuses on the specific role and 
characteristics of smaller countries. Defining “small” countries is problematic, but it is 
nevertheless useful to distinguish small countries within the EU from bigger ones such as 
France.126 
 
2.2.1 Individual countries and different reasons to comply with sanctions 
Helwig & Pesu recognize different steps needed for analyzing how individual countries 
participate in sanctions regimes. They describe elements in the decision-making process as 
being manifold: “strategic culture, economic factors, security concerns, history, and 
international pressure and norms”. These factors overlap to some extent with the general 
sanctions theory discussed in the previous sections, but carry some differences with it as well. 
In theorizing the role of individual countries, they argue that it is firstly important to look at a 
state’s general attitude towards sanctions as a policy instrument. This largely concerns the 
strategic culture of countries. Some countries have a stronger tradition of softer diplomatic 
measures, while others are more prone to move towards measures that are more coercive.127 
For example, The Netherlands is a country with an idealist culture that uses sanctions when 
core foreign policy values are considered to be under threat.128 
Secondly, a country’s position on a certain sanctions package is important in 
understanding how different countries participate in sanctions regimes. This has to do with for 
example geographical location. A country’s position towards a specific sanctions package 
also relates to the theory of economic interdependence; the more a sanctions-sending country 
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is trading with a receiver, the more this is likely to hinder sanctions imposition and upholding. 
Other factors such as friendship between two countries are also important to consider. 
Thirdly, the international environment also helps to explain why countries join sanctions 
regimes. Peer pressure can and often does play a large role in upholding sanctions. In the EU, 
this peer pressure is especially present. Individual countries in the EU need to consider their 
steps thoroughly when they go against the broader consensus, because this can decrease future 
bargaining powers.129  
Whether EU member states prefer milder or stricter sanctions is influenced by both 
domestic and international factors. Besides the opinions of the governments of different 
countries, different domestic actors shape the attitude towards sanctions on the domestic level. 
Portela et al. argue that the interplay between different actors in a state determines the 
eventual outcome of how a state behaves in upholding sanctions. The domestic groups 
shaping the attitude of a state can roughly be divided in three different actors: the political 
elites, public opinion and the business elites. According to Portela et al., any state that is in 
favor of stricter sanctions includes certain domestic groups that are against these sanctions. 
On the other hand, countries wanting milder sanctions include domestic groups in favor of 
stricter sanctions. The attitudes of individual countries are thus not set in stone: instead, 
domestic differences influence and can change opinions of states on the international level.130 
In the QCA of this study, the focus is on the political elites. However, by taking into account 
the different political parties represented in the parliament, this study also grasps to a lower 
extent the views of the public opinion and the business elites. 
To understand the way states can participate in sanctions regimes better, theory 
concerning normative, inward-facing reasons of individual states to participate in the 
international sphere is helpful. While this theory is common in human rights literature, it has 
been applied to the EU sanctions on Russia as well by for example Sjursen and Rosén. 
According to them, the agreement on establishing sanctions, for example, was reached due to 
“a sense of collective commitment to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination” in 
EU member states.131 They argue that it is important to take into account the normative power 
of arguments in favor of implementing common EU sanctions.132  
                                                     
129 Helwig and Pesu, “EU Decision-making on Sanctions Regimes,” 95-96. 
130 Portela et al., “Consensus against all odds,” 684-695. 
131 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén, “Arguing Sanctions. On the EU’s Response to the Crisis in Ukraine,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 1 (2017): 32. 
132 Ibid., 20; 29-31. 
28 
 
Besides understanding how the EU implements sanctions through normative cohesion, 
it is also useful to take normative reasons for individual member states into consideration 
when studying sanctions prolonging. In constructivist thinking on norms, it is assumed that 
states follow a so-called logic of appropriateness, a concept developed by March and 
Olsen.133 States following the logic of appropriateness make decisions according to social 
norms and conceptions of what is right, instead of a purely economic analysis of what is most 
beneficial. In other words, according to this logic, a country makes decisions based on what 
they see as morally correct. The institutionalization of social practices determines what 
appropriateness is, and develops over time through learning. In following constructivist 
thinking with regard to sanctions, it is thus important to understand how EU countries come to 
think of something as morally right.134  
According to constructivist thought, ideas about what is right come into place through, 
for example, socialization and acculturation. Socialization comprises the process of certain 
ideas becoming broadly accepted norms from within a particular region. Once these norms are 
generally accepted, they strongly influence state behavior.135 Through acculturation, a state 
adopts norms that become prevailing in society. As norms and ideas spread, actors become 
acculturated to them, which then set a change of a state’s behavior into motion. It is not a 
sudden process, but causes behavioral change that is sometimes stronger than coercion or 
constraining processes. Through acculturation, a country gets a certain idea of what is morally 
‘right’.136 Both socialization and acculturation are, according to constructivist thinking, 
important in constructing a certain idea of what is appropriate. 
In the EU, for example, the processes of socialization and acculturation can take place 
through deep integration. In being part of the EU, countries can behave in ways that are to 
some extent expected of them, and through acculturation and socialization make these norms 
commonly accepted and integrated in the domestic sphere. In upholding sanctions regimes, 
such a norm could explain why EU states feel the urge to comply, even when sanctions mean 
an economic disadvantage for the country. Normative cohesion of EU member states can thus 
be one of the reasons for prolonging sanctions. 
                                                     
133 James March and Johan Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Science, ed. Robert Goodin (Oxford University Press, 2011), 478. 
134 Ibid., 478-479. 
135 Beth Simmons, “Treaty Compliance and Violation,” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 278-280. 
136 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and 
Normative Challenges,” Duke Law Journal 54 (2005): 991-997. 
29 
 
The impact of international norms on domestic policy decisions does not only come 
from the international level. Institutionalization of norms takes place more forcefully in the 
domestic sphere. Between countries, this institutionalization varies based on the domestic 
structure.137 Cortell and Davis state that domestic political processes influence state behavior 
based on international norms. They argue that the effects of international norms depend on the 
salience of the norm in the domestic political discourse as well as domestic political 
factors.138 Thus, in accustoming themselves to a certain norm, countries have both an 
international and a domestic, inward-facing structure at play. In sanctions regimes, this can 
cause countries to implement sanctions to show domestic audiences that they have done the 
morally right thing. 
When analyzing the attitudes of individual countries in sanctions regimes, it is hence 
important to bear in mind that different elements affect why countries participate in sanctions. 
These elements include the general attitude towards sanctions, the specific sanctions package 
and the international environment. It is also of importance to note that even though countries 
eventually have one stance towards implementing and upholding sanctions in the EU, there is 
a plurality of perspectives within the country as well. In explaining other reasons why 
countries participate in sanctions regimes, normative reasons are good to take in to account. 
States are expected to have a certain inward-facing normative idea for participating in 
sanctions regimes, which does not directly target the state suffering from sanctions. In other 
words, sanctions are not always upheld to just comply with the formulated objective of them. 
 
2.2.2 Distinguishing larger and smaller member states 
The theory discussed previously for a large part applies to individual states in general. 
However, this theory does not work the same in all member states. One of the ways to 
distinguish different member states in the EU is to classify them according to their size. 
Scholars often highlight the role of “large” countries such as Germany, stating for example 
that German leadership is an “assertive hegemon” in the EU’s foreign policy towards 
Russia.139 However, problematic in this narrative is that it ignores the influence other EU 
states have. It is important to take countries that are not “large” into account, since all 
countries in the EU have to decide on sanctions unanimously.140 
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It is complicated to determine exactly what a small state is, since “small” depends on 
the context of a country. Small states can be defined in their relation to bigger powers; in this 
case, bigger states such as France are the opposite of small states in the EU. However, this 
kind of definition does not really answer the question of what small states are exactly.141 A 
definition of small states can also be based on a combination of the state’s population size and 
self-representation. The latter understands the self-representation of small states as 
significantly different from that of larger states, mainly because smaller states represent 
themselves as being more vulnerable to changes in the security environment.142 Other 
definitions of small states have focused on the capabilities of them, meaning that the amount 
of power of individual states determines their size. However, power does not say much about 
the challenges and behavior of small states. In addition, it has just as the definition based on 
self-representation a focus based largely on security policy. A more workable definition 
focuses on the “spatio-temporal” context of small states, which is less tied to general 
characteristics.143 A state can be weak in some relations, but stronger in others. Within the 
EU, small states are in the spatio-temporal definition those that are unable to change “the 
basic contours of this context”.144 In other words, small states in the EU are unable to change 
the basic contours of the EU drastically. The impact of France leaving the EU would change 
the institution fundamentally, while the impact of Austria doing the same is significantly less. 
 
2.2.3 EU integration theory and small states 
A visible distinction between small countries and larger countries is detectable in EU 
integration theory. When analyzing the role of small states in EU sanctions regimes, 
integration theories are helpful to understand how decisions on sanctions are made. This can 
be done on a supranational level, but could also take place with more influence of national 
governments. EU integration theory has a large history of thought that, in its core, is based on 
two grand theories: intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.145 In short, neofunctionalism 
tends to see European integration as containing spillovers of integration, leading to more 
integration. Intergovernmentalism considers state preferences important in European 
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cooperation, which is achieved through bargaining.146 Within these theories, smaller countries 
are generally expected to lean towards a neofunctionalist approach of European integration, 
because their power to act alone is smaller than that of bigger countries. Therefore, smaller 
countries often prefer cooperation on the centralized, European level.147 After slipping in its 
attention following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, European-wide challenges in the 2000s and 
2010s renewed the focus on these grand theories of European integration. Nowadays, new 
versions of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are on the table in the academic 
debate as well, which fit the current situation in a better way. Useful examples of these 
renewed theories are postfunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism.148 
Postfunctionalism sees, like neofunctionalism, a potential for some sort of identity 
formation in Europe.149 Postfunctionalism, however, puts much more focus on political 
contestation in EU politics. According to postfunctionalists, this has come to the centre of EU 
politics. Central is that the former consensus over Europe changed into a “constraining 
dissensus”.150 This means that European integration is not anymore a self-evident process of 
spillovers. This is partly due to the rise of Eurosceptic parties, changes in public opinion and 
EU legitimacy problems. Political leaders need to “look over their shoulders when negotiating 
European issues”.151 Domestic support for European integration is not as united as before. 
When attempting to evolve European integration, government actors need to look for support 
more actively.152 This theory is thus much more skeptical about closer European integration. 
Postfunctionalism sees the combination of functional EU integration and exclusive identities 
as potentially disruptive.153 Centrally organized sanctions can, according to postfunctionalist 
accounts on EU integration, lead to weaker preferences for integration.154 This is especially 
the case in small countries. They are generally not in the position to control their environment 
as larger countries can, meaning that they prefer cooperating internationally to reduce 
unpredictability. They might be critical of international cooperation, but leaving an institution 
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such as the EU seems for smaller member states unlikely.155 In a postfunctionalist approach 
towards European integration, these countries thus participate in sanctions regimes despite 
skepticism towards this close integration. 
New intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, does not see supranational institutions 
as the main actors behind European integration. Instead, consensus-seeking national 
governments are the main driver. New intergovernmentalism sees the post-Maastricht period 
as a period in which integration has become more intense and highlights tensions between 
elites and domestic voters. Integration is not prevented by constraining dissensus, but new 
intergovernmentalism sees a division between the skeptical public and integrationist leaders. 
In relation to sanctions regimes in the EU, new intergovernmentalism expects member states 
to actively influence the discussion on sanctions regimes, while leaving less space to the 
supranational drivers behind these. Both postfunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism see 
problems in the legitimacy of the EU, but their vision of how integration should take place is 
different.156 
When connecting European integration theory to sanctions, thus, much of its relevance 
is in understanding to what extent individual countries influence the decision-making on 
sanctions. On the one hand, this can be done on the supranational level, meaning that more 
power is left to the Council of the EU. This approach fits more in neofunctionalist and 
postfunctionalist schools of thought. On the other hand, countries can prefer a (new) 
intergovernmental approach, which puts more focus on the role of individual member states in 
prolonging sanctions. In this research, both postfunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism 
are important in explaining how small member states approach EU sanctions regimes. Since 
small countries generally tend to have less influence in the EU than bigger countries, 
postfunctionalist aspects are most important in explaining small states behavior in sanctions 
regimes. In the data, it is thus expected that Dutch and Finnish politicians prefer cooperation 
on the supranational level. At the same time, this means that domestic disapproval of the 
effects of this cooperation comes to the foreground, which points towards a constraining 
dissensus. However, especially since sanctions impact EU countries differently, some 
politicians are expected to urge their government to proactively discuss sanctions in the EU. 
In this case, new intergovernmentalism is also helpful in explaining the way in which 
sanctions are prolonged.  
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3. Research design and method 
To understand how national parliaments reflect on sanctions, this thesis uses Qualitative 
Content Analysis (QCA) to analyze parliamentary documents from both the Netherlands and 
Finland. This chapter starts by exploring the versatility of QCA, both in general and for this 
study. After going deeper into the method, this chapter presents the research design for this 
study, including the coding frame. While this chapter presents the construction and content of 
the coding frame, which are part of the results, the fourth chapter presents the results in more 
detail. The full coding frame, coding sheets of the first and second coding, as well as all units 
of coding can be found in the appendixes.  
 
3.1 Qualitative Content Analysis in context 
As Finnish and Dutch parliamentary debates produce large sets of data, it is necessary to 
organize this data in a structured manner. For this study, the purpose is to elicit meaning from 
this data to explain why and in which ways the representative democratic bodies support the 
upholding of sanctions. In doing so, the goal is to figure out the main structures underlying 
the opinions of politicians. 
 QCA has evolved into an effective method to interpret and organize large pieces of 
data.157 This allows for making “valid inferences from text”.158 QCA makes it possible to 
focus within texts on specific research questions, while systematically taking out those parts 
that are irrelevant for the research. This is useful for this study, because the goal is to extract 
and distinguish different opinions from large amounts of text. The roots of the method lay in 
quantitative content analysis, which originates in the middle of the 20th century. Where 
quantitative content analysis focused on frequency counts of certain terms or concepts in 
texts, qualitative content analysis takes a systematic, interpretative approach to the meaning of 
material.159 
In this research, the results of the QCA do not necessarily stand on their own, but do 
reflect an external social reality that is not always reflected in the material. In other words, 
describing the meaning of material includes drawing conclusions that do not lay directly in 
the material.160 This study does not aim to come up with new theoretical foundations drawn 
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from the data, as is done in for example Grounded Theory. Instead, the goal is to interpret the 
large data present in political debates and infer meaning from this by using the theoretical 
framework presented in chapter 2.161 
This work uses QCA primarily to conduct a so-called latent analysis. A latent analysis 
includes that a study interprets data. Latent analyses do not purely describe what data states, 
but tries to find a deeper meaning as well. A latent analysis is useful to understand qualitative 
data. This is different from a manifest analysis of data, which stays very close to the text and 
requires less interpretation. Since parliamentary documents need contextualization and 
interpretation, this study mainly uses latent analysis.162 For example, when politicians use 
figures of speech in their opinions about sanctions, it requires a degree of interpretation. It is 
not the primary goal of this research to find a deeper meaning beyond what politicians have 
expressed, for example to unravel long-term domestic strategies of particular political parties. 
However, the design of this research makes that underlying patterns in sanctions prolonging 
are discovered, as is the case in a latent analysis. Despite it being a latent analysis, some parts 
of the material in this study need less interpretation. This in turn means that this study also 
uses content in a manifest way.163 
In doing the QCA, this study follows the steps described by Margrit Schreier. This 
means that the research started by deciding on a research question, followed by the selection 
of materials to be used in the QCA. This research uses parliamentary documents from 2016, 
which section 3.2 describes in more detail. The third step a QCA according to Schreier is 
building a coding frame, after which the material is divided into separate units of coding, 
which are the single pieces of text to be coded.164 This coding frame is used in a trial coding, 
which is tried in a part of the data. This data set needs to be sufficient in its variability and 
needs to be large enough to try out the entire coding frame.165 After a trial coding and 
modification of the coding frame, the main analysis of the units of coding is done. To ensure 
consistency and increase reliability, parts of the main coding need to double-coded, according 
to Schreier. To ensure a high standard of consistency and reliability and because this study is 
conducted by one person, the main coding in this study is done twice with an interval of one 
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month.166 The last step of a successful QCA is presenting the main findings and putting them 
into context, to which chapter four is dedicated.167 
 
3.2 Selection of main material 
The data used in this analysis comprises Dutch and Finnish parliamentary documents 
discussing EU sanctions on Russia. To ensure that the focus is on understanding how EU 
sanctions are prolonged, the data used comes from 2016. In the case of sanctions on Russia, 
using documents from 2016 to investigate domestic political influence on EU policy is useful 
for many reasons. Firstly, this period is a relatively calm moment in the sanctions policy of 
the EU on Russia. In 2015, for example, EU sanctions on Russia changed still significantly 
due to the alignment of EU sanctions to the Minsk agreements.168 While such change is 
important to investigate as well, it does not reflect the continuation of sanctions as well as a 
different moment in time. Secondly, 2016 is both in Finland and the Netherlands 
characterized by relative stability in the political sphere. When researching the political aspect 
of the continuation of sanctions, it is useful that there are no major policy changes in 
countries’ foreign policy. Both in the Netherlands and Finland there were no changes of 
government in 2016. In the Netherlands, national elections took place in 2017, with a change 
of Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2018.169 In Finland, elections took place in 2015, with a 
major change in 2017.170 Thus, at least in the domestic political sphere of both countries, 2016 
is a relatively stable moment in time to investigate. Lastly, 2016 is useful to research since all 
sanctions that were in place in that year were prolonged. This is due to the design of EU 
sanctions on Russia, which needed to be prolonged every six or twelve months.171 
 In selecting the data, this study used digital archives from both the Finnish and Dutch 
parliaments.172 In the Finnish case, the documents used are minutes (pöytäkirjat) from plenary 
sessions in 2016 in the parliament. The documents under study do not include minutes from 
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the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs (Ulkoasiainvaliokunta), because this 
committee is rather responsible for approving documents instead of being involved in a public 
debate on foreign affairs. The Dutch documents include minutes (handelingen) from both 
plenary sessions in the parliament as well as debates in smaller committees (kamerstukken) in 
2016, in which most parliamentary debates in the Dutch political system take place.173 
 As stated, there is no fixed procedure for sanctions prolonging and discussion within 
individual member states. In the EU, discussions in the Council of the EU determine whether 
sanctions are prolonged, tightened or lifted. In the domestic sphere, it is up to each member 
state to decide how they discuss sanctions.174 Since there is no fixed procedure, this study 
used key words to capture all debates addressing sanctions in 2016. First, documents were 
filtered by using the key words “sanctions”, “Russia”, “Ukraine”, “Putin”, “Crimea” and 
combinations of these words. To make sure that the debates concern sanctions effects and 
policies, every document under study includes the word sanctions at least once.175 This 
approach resulted in approximately 200 Dutch documents, while approximately 250 
documents on the Finnish side came out of the first selection. This first selection still included 
briefings by the government, to ensure that necessary context for debates is taken into 
account. Since the goal of this study is to find the political factors determining sanctions 
continuation, the actual QCA does not include letters and policy documents. The focus is 
instead on parliamentary sessions, in which different opinions come to the foreground. 
Therefore, the next step of data selection included taking out all parliamentary letters, formal 
questions, briefing papers and other policy documents. This resulted in 23 different Finnish 
debates, while 27 debates reached the final selection of documents to be studied on the Dutch 
side. Eventually, as will be described in more detail in section 3.3, the final units of analysis 
included 13 Dutch and 14 Finnish parliamentary debates (see for a full overview of data 
selection table 2 on page 40). 
 To avoid creating bias, the next step of the selection of relevant data is using a small 
coding frame including the categories relevant and irrelevant, as proposed by Schreier.176 The 
relevant material to the research question includes discussions directly related to sanctions in 
a broad sense. Therefore, whenever sanctions were under discussion, all related data is in this 
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step classified as relevant. This includes data that covers sanctions on other countries than 
Russia, to make sure that any references to the sanctions on Russia are included. Since most 
debates do not have the discussion of EU sanctions as main subject, data classified as 
irrelevant includes all data unrelated to sanctions. Irrelevant data at this stage includes for 
example discussions about Sudan and the development of nuclear power plants. This 
irrelevant data usually appeared as part of a long document including different topics, of 
which sanctions were only one part of the discussion. Some key words, such as “Russia”, 
resulted in documents not related to sanctions. Separating irrelevant material from relevant 
data, 20 Dutch and 16 Finnish parliamentary documents remained. Next, according to 
Schreier, a successful QCA moves to the construction of a coding frame. The exact selection 
of data useful for the QCA follows on the construction of the coding frame, which is 
described in the next section.177 
 
3.3 Constructing the coding frame and units of coding 
In QCA, the coding frame “functions as a system that will transform the data into meaningful, 
manageable, specific, and smaller units of information (also known as codes or categories), 
and facilitate the ongoing interpretative sense-making process.”178 In other words, the coding 
frame helps in making large amounts of data graspable for analysis. Coding frames can be 
structured in concept-driven and data-driven ways. The QCA in this research combines both 
methods. This means that the categories in the coding frame reflect on the one hand theory on 
sanctions implementation and upholding. On the other hand, categories also flow to an 
important extent out of the data used.179 Since the research questions concern many aspects of 
sanctions and European integration, the coding frame is of high complexity. A coding frame 
of high complexity consists of several dimensions with multiple hierarchical categories 
connecting to them. The dimensions cover the main aspects deriving from the data relevant 
for this research. Dimensions are unidimensional, meaning that they only cover one aspect of 
the material. Within dimensions, different categories make it possible to grasp different 
opinions of politicians. In most parts of the coding frame, these categories break apart into 
even smaller categories.180  
                                                     
177 Schreier, Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice, 84. 
178 Ali Fuad Selvi, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” in The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Applied 
Linguistics, eds. Jim McKinley and Heath Rose (Routledge 2019): 444. 
179 Schreier, Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice, 89-90. 
180 Ibid., 67-72. 
38 
 
 As stated earlier, the main goal of this QCA is to get a grasp of how politicians look 
towards sanctions implementation, continuation, changing circumstances as well as EU 
integration. In breaking down the material, the coding frame consists of five main dimensions 
(see table 1). The first dimension concerns what stance politicians have towards continuing 
the sanctions in place, without taking reasons for doing so into account. This dimension gives 
an idea of the general opinion of politicians towards the EU sanctions on Russia. Dimensions 
2 and 3 consider reasons for sanctions regimes. Dimension 2 concentrates on reasons to lift 
the sanctions in place, while the third dimension comprises reasons for implementing new 
sanctions or for keeping the current sanctions in place. 
The fourth dimension focuses on the way politicians want to deal with the current sanctions in 
place, and whether they look for solutions on the national or international level. The last 
dimension looks at the role politicians want their government to play when sanctions are 
under discussion on the EU level. 
 While all dimensions are to some extent related, they cover different aspects of the 
research. Three dimensions (1, 2 and 3) deal with sanctions policy itself. These dimensions 
cover a general stance towards sanctions and on what ground they make certain decisions 
about sanctions policies. Two dimensions (4 and 5) cover the tension between different actors 
in dealing with sanctions. These dimensions look at the interplay between national and 
international levels, and the way politicians look towards the EU when it comes to sanctions. 
The five dimensions in table 1 cover a wide range of topics related to sanctions 
relevant to the main goals of this study. Important to note is that the research does not focus 
on whether the general tool of sanctions is good or bad. In other words, the QCA does not aim 
to cover opinions of politicians wanting to change the general sanctions tool of the EU, which 
in the documents under study is not under discussion. In addition, the dimensions do not 
cover other measures than sanctions. Statements arguing for increasing the budget for an army 
to stop a perceived threat, for example, are not included in the coding frame. 
Table 1. The five dimensions and their function in this QCA 
Dimension Aspect of the research 
1. Sanctions continuation Sanctions logic 
2. Reasons for implementing new or upholding existing sanctions  
 
Sanctions logic 
3. Reasons for lifting sanctions  Sanctions logic 
4. Role in EU cooperation Scale & EU integration 
5. Dealing with existing sanctions Scale & EU integration 
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 The concept-driven categories in this study derive from sanctions theory and EU 
integration theory presented in chapter 2. The fifth dimension, for example, derives directly 
from EU integration theory. Different EU integration theories represent different behavior of 
member-states in EU cooperation. Concept-driven categories also come to the foreground in 
the second and third dimension, which cover reasons to lift, prolong or increase sanctions. 
These dimensions include categories related to for example the logic of interdependence and 
primary, secondary and tertiary objectives that are discussed in chapter 2. In the type of 
sanctions that parliamentarians want to uphold or implement, the theory concerning coercing, 
constraining and signaling is included.  
Besides concept-driven categories, the coding frame includes data-driven categories 
generated through subsumption. This inductive approach is useful to construct categories once 
a main dimension is set up. Subsumption starts by reading closely through text and 
encountering relevant concepts. These concepts can be subsumed under either an existing 
category or a new subcategory. This process continues until no new concepts appear.181 
Subsumption is an effective way to cover most relevant material in the data and it ensures that 
two important features of a good coding frame are covered. It makes that the coding frame 
complies with exhaustiveness, which is the case when all material can be assigned to a code. 
In addition, subsumption also is helpful in creating saturation, which is reached when each 
subcategory is used at least once in the main coding.182 
To distinguish different countries in the analysis of the QCA, units of coding receive a 
label belonging to either the Netherlands or Finland. In addition, the status of the 
parliamentarian being part of governmental parties or opposition parties is pointed out. While 
it is not within the scope of this study to analyze all different opinions of each political party, 
it is useful to investigate whether there is a significant difference between opposition and the 
government to understand the strategy of a country within the wider international context. 
Understanding different opinions of opposition parties can also bring certain opinions that are 
present in society to the foreground, without the official policy of the country being that way. 
Once a preliminary coding frame was constructed, the final steps in selecting the data 
to be coded are taken by deciding on the so-called units of analysis, the units of coding and 
the context units. Units of analysis comprise each case on which QCA is performed, which in 
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this study are the different political debates. The amount of units of analysis in this study is 
27, of which 13 come from Dutch debates while 14 are in Finnish. After selecting relevant 
data in a broad sense from these large units of analysis, as described in section 3.2, the 
remaining data was divided by using segmentation. Through segmentation, it is possible to 
divide larger data into smaller units. These smaller units are the units of coding, which can  
be coded with help of the coding frame.183 
In segmentation, both formal and thematic criteria are used. Formal criteria comprise 
formal rules that state how big a unit can be. In this QCA, the most important formal criterion 
is that units of coding only comprise statements of one politician. Thus, when the chair gives 
speaking time to someone new, the unit of coding has ended. The main way this study 
distinguishes relevant material, however, comes through thematic criteria. These criteria make 
that units of coding only comprise one part of the material and do not cover several 
subcategories at the same time. The thematic criteria in this study mainly flow out of the 
coding frame. In addition, units of coding are distinguished when a politician mentions 
different arguments in one speech or interruption.184 For example, when a politician first 
criticizes its own government for sanctions-related speech and thereafter stresses that 
sanctions cannot be lifted when Ukraine and Russia set steps forward, two different units of 
coding are constructed.185 
For the parliamentary documents of the Netherlands and Finland, using formal and 
thematic criteria resulted in 170-200 units of coding per country. Context units accompany 
these units of coding. A context unit is “that portion of the surrounding material (…) to 
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Steps in data selection Remaining data 
1. Preliminary selection of units of analysis 
(parliamentary documents) by using key words 
Approximately 200 Dutch and 250 Finnish 
documents 
2. Taking out all documents that are not parliamentary 
sessions (i.e. letters, formal questions, briefing 
papers) 
27 Dutch and 23 Finnish parliamentary 
sessions (preliminary units of analysis) 
3. Selection of relevant material in a broad sense 
using a simple relevant – irrelevant coding frame 
20 Dutch and 16 Finnish parliamentary 
sessions (preliminary units of analysis)  
4. Construction of preliminary coding frame based on 
theory and data; deciding on the units of coding 
using segmentation, followed by a trial coding 
170-200 units of coding per country 
5. Revision of the coding frame followed by main 
coding, taking out the units of coding considered 
irrelevant 
175 Dutch and 162 Finnish units of coding 
from 13 Dutch and 14 Finnish parliamentary 
sessions (units of analysis) 
Table 2. Overview of data selection from raw data to final units of analysis and units of coding. 
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understand the meaning of a given unit of coding”.186 Thus, context units are necessary to be 
able to code the units of coding correctly. In the case of this study, context units mainly 
comprise the full paragraph from speeches of politicians. In some cases, it includes previous 
politicians’ speeches, to understand what the debate is focusing on.187 
 Once a preliminary coding frame is constructed and units of coding are selected, the 
next step in a successful QCA is the pilot phase, which is the first step of the actual data 
analysis. The core of the pilot phase is a trial coding, which is complemented by a consistency 
check and an adjustment of the coding frame. This phase is important for discovering 
shortcomings in the coding frame as well as finding out additional aspects of meaning in the 
data.188 The pilot phase is important to deal with any discrepancies or difficulties in the 
coding frame, so that it can still be modified for the main analysis process.189 The pilot phase 
is thus useful in increasing the reliability of the research. In addition, it decreases the chance 
for possible shortcomings to occur in later stages. 
 In selecting material for the trial coding, the first and most important concern is 
variability. The selection of data for the trial coding must be representative for the material. In 
this study, for example, both data from the Netherlands and Finland needed to be included in 
the trial coding. In addition, data from different debates was selected. The diversity in units of 
analysis was decided upon before starting the trial coding. Secondly, it is important to try out 
the entire coding frame. If one dimension is completely overlooked, for example, it means the 
trial coding is not sufficient. The trial coding in this study continued until both concerns were 
fulfilled. As a result, this means that the trial coding included 61 units of coding from Dutch 
parliamentary documents, while from the Finnish side 69 units of coding were used. Thus, 
approximately 39% of the total units of coding were included in the trial coding, making it a 
significant amount to be able to get a grasp of the reliability of the coding frame.190 
When reviewing a coding frame, reliability and validity are two of the most common 
concepts. While reliability is a contested concept, “an instrument is called reliable to the 
extent that it yields data that is free of error”.191 Even though it is complicated to assess 
whether qualitative research is completely reliable because of meaning being context-
dependent, it is still important to assess the reliability of coding frames as much as possible. 
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The most important aspect of reliability in QCA is consistency. In assessing consistency, this 
study uses stability: comparisons of the coding frame across points in time. This means in 
practice that both the trial coding and main coding were done twice with an interval of a 
month, after which both coding sessions were compared. This consistency check can cause 
changes to the coding frame in the pilot phase, to make distinctions between categories 
clearer. When comparing both sessions during the main coding, it is needed to take a closer 
look at units of coding that are coded differently, which then are labeled with the most 
suitable codes.192 
 Related to reliability is the concept of validity. According to Schreier, “an instrument 
is considered valid to the extent that it captures what it sets out to capture”.193 For a coding 
frame used for QCA, this means that the extent of validity depends on whether the categories 
adequately represent the concepts that are being studied. In this study, this means that the 
dimensions and categories of the coding frame need to reflect both the theory and data related 
to sanctions, power and European integration.194 In assessing validity, the most important 
criteria are face and content validity. Face validity is “the extent to which a measure (…) 
seems to tap the desired concept.”195 In other words, face validity concerns whether the 
coding frame actually relates to what is under study. Signs of low face validity are, for 
example, high coding frequencies for residual categories (i.e. the categories “other”) or 
extremely high coding frequencies for one subcategory, when this is not reflected in the 
material itself.196 In the pilot phase of this study, this has not been the case. In assessing 
validity of QCA, content validity is also important. Content validity is “the extent to which 
the measure reflects the full domain of the concept being measured”.197 In other words, 
content validity in QCA means that the theoretical concepts used are reflected in the coding 
frame. In this study, content validity is most visible in the different dimensions of the coding 
frame, which come forth out of the theory. 
 The construction of a well-grounded QCA is, as this section described, a complicated 
process. In this study, the coding frame is based on both concept-driven and data-driven 
methods, through which five different dimensions including subcategories are constructed. 
The coding in this study includes a division of the Netherlands and Finland as well as a 
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distinction between politicians of government parties and those in the opposition. This last 
distinction is mainly meant to be able to separate clear discrepancies between the opposition 
and government, without considering them as clear and separate entities. This is undesirable 
because it generalizes all political parties into one being, and is undesirable because the 
opposition parties constitute only about one third of all units of coding. Through 
segmentation, data was divided into units of coding, of which a part was used in the pilot 
phase to try out the coding frame. In assessing the coding frame, reliability and validity are 
important concepts this study takes into account. After fulfilling all prerequisites to start with 
the main coding, the next section concerns the steps used in finalizing the main coding frame 
and conducting the actual coding. 
 
3.4 Final coding frame and main coding 
After finishing the pilot phase, it is common that a coding frame needs adjustment in several 
regards, to ensure its reliability and validity. In this study, the main dimensions stayed the 
same after completing the pilot phase. The order, structure and amount of subcategories, 
however, underwent changes. The most important change in the structure of subcategories 
concerned the third dimension, which is visible in table 3. The coding frame initially did not 
separate reasons for stricter sanctions and upholding existing sanctions. However, the final 
coding frame divides these as two subcategories because of clear differences during the trial 
coding in reasons for upholding sanctions as compared to stricter sanctions. By separating 
both subcategories, it is possible to interpret these differences. 
Trial coding frame Main coding frame 
3. Reasons for new or upholding sanctions 
a. Strategic culture 
b. Minsk agreement 
c. New reasons 
i. Syria 
ii. Other 




f. Escalation prevention (signaling) 
Etc. 
3. Reasons for new or upholding sanctions 
a. Stricter sanctions 




iii. Security concerns 
iv. Escalation prevention (signaling) 
a. Upholding sanctions 
i. Strategic culture 
ii. Minsk agreement 
Etc. 
Table 3. Differences between the trial coding frame and main coding frame. In the main coding frame, 
stricter sanctions and upholding existing sanctions are divided into two categories. In addition, to ensure 
being closer to the data, some categories were renamed and classified differently. To achieve saturation, 
some categories were left out of the main coding frame (such as 3.c.ii, while 3.a only exists in the main 
coding frame under “upholding sanctions”). 
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In revising the coding frame, the amount of subcategories decreased to ensure 
saturation. Some categories coming out of sanctions theory were not detectable in the data. 
This concerns categories that were constructed in a concept-driven way. For example, in the 
trial coding frame, the first dimension “sanctions continuation” included subcategories 
distinguishing types of stricter sanctions. These subcategories were based on Giumelli’s 
division of coercing, constraining and signaling sanctions.198 However, in the expressions of 
politicians, calling for stricter sanctions often excluded a specific type classifiable in these 
three categories. Therefore, the subcategory concerning stricter sanctions in dimension 1 was 
brought back to a simpler distinction between “specific” (1.a.1) and “general/unclear” (1.a.ii) 
sanctions. It is still important to include this distinction, to be able to analyze whether 
politicians have specific proposals for types of sanctions to come into place.  
In the QCA, dimension one covers the opinions of politicians on whether they want 
sanctions to become stricter, continue, or be lifted. This dimension is the most clear-cut 
dimension and covers the general opinion on what to do with the current sanctions in place. 
The results in this dimension are mainly useful in showing and analyzing the different 
national debates regarding sanctions. When many politicians in one country argue for stricter 
sanctions, for example, this has a reflection on the reasons politicians give for having stricter 
sanctions, which is covered in the fifth dimension. The logic of interdependence, as used by 
Silva II and Selden, is also covered in the first dimension. Since Finland and the Netherlands 
have different relations with Russia, this logic presumably causes differences in the ways 
countries want to go ahead with sanctions.199 
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1. Sanctions continuation 
a. Stricter 
i. Specific  
ii. General/unclear  
b. Continuation 
i. Explicitly in favor 
ii. Implicitly in favor  
c. Lifting  
d. Indifferent / unclear  
e. Other 
Dimension 1. Sanctions continuation. This dimension covers whether parliamentarians want sanctions on 
Russia to continue as before, or whether they would like them to be different. 
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The second and third dimensions of the coding frame cover different reasons 
politicians raise for sanctions regimes. Whereas the second dimension covers reasons to lift 
sanctions, the third dimension concerns reasons for implementing new or prolonging the 
current sanctions. These dimensions make it possible to look at the reasoning of politicians 
behind sanctions regimes. By separating these reasons, it is possible to analyze what roles 
politicians play in sanctions regimes and what kinds of power are exercised in sanctions 
prolonging. As very few politicians in this study call for an immediate lifting of sanctions, the 
second dimension includes reasons that politicians give for coming closer to lifting the 
sanctions. This dimension makes it possible to determine what objectives politicians have 
regarding sanctions, and whether they have different opinions in the lifting of sanctions. 
These differences are important to take into account, because they have certain influence on 
the way the countries behave in the international sphere. 
 
The third dimension concerns reasons to prolong or implement new sanctions regimes. 
This dimension is separated into two main subcategories, of which the first concerns reasons 
for implementing stricter sanctions. The different categories in implementing stricter 
sanctions are mainly constructed through segmentation, but each connect to different 
objectives politicians want to reach when implementing sanctions. For example, the 
subcategories concern new reasons for implementing sanctions, which are constraining 
sanctions. It also includes reasons stating that new sanctions need to prevent future 
escalations, which are signaling sanctions. 
The second main subcategory concerns reasons to uphold existing sanctions. When 
analyzing units of codes falling under this subcategory, it is important to note that there is not 
one way in which politicians want current sanctions to continue. This subcategory includes 
statements that are against implementing stricter sanctions, but does include opinions against 
2. Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions 
a. Economic reasons  
b. United EU 
c. Minsk agreement 
i. Full implementation 
ii. Partial implementation 
d. General impact of current sanctions 
e. Ineffectiveness 
f. Other 
Dimension 2. Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions. This dimension covers all reasons that 
politicians give for lifting the sanctions. Statements coded in this dimension do not necessarily reflect that 




milder sanctions as well. It also concerns politicians who are not necessarily against a stricter 
or milder version of sanctions, but actively support the current sanctions in place. The 
different subcategories thus concern a wide range of reasons for upholding the current 
sanctions regimes, ranging from keeping unity within the EU to the strategic culture of a 
country. 
 
The fourth dimension covers the way politicians see that current sanctions should be 
dealt with. It does not cover whether politicians consider the current sanctions to be good or 
bad, but instead concentrates on the solutions they see to the current sanctions in place. The 
goal of this dimension is to show on what level Finland and the Netherlands want to deal with 
the sanctions, which in essence means that it looks to see whether countries deal with 
sanctions on a national or international level. Within these different levels, this dimension 
shows what means of dealing with sanctions politicians propose. Separating the national and 
international level shows how individual countries behave within EU sanctions regimes that 
are already in place. It also makes it possible to distinguish what politicians see as methods to 
lighten the impact of sanctions. The focus on scale and dealing with the sanctions makes it 
possible to analyze the role of different countries in European integration processes. If a 
3. Reasons for implementing new or upholding the existing sanctions 
a. Stricter sanctions 
i. New reasons 
1. Syria 
2. MH17 
ii. Ineffectiveness of current sanctions 
iii. Security concerns 
iv. Prevention of future escalations (signaling) 
b. Upholding existing sanctions  
i. Strategic culture 
ii. Minsk agreement 
iii. Continued involvement 
1. Ukraine, Crimea 
2. MH17 
3. Other / unclear 
iv. Security concerns 
1. Domestic / EU concerns 
2. Other regions 
v. Effectivity of current sanctions 
1. Counterproductive/ineffective 
2. Other 
vi. United EU 
vii. Other 
Dimension 3. Reasons for implementing new or upholding sanctions. This dimension covers all statements 
that shows parliamentarians wanting to either make the current sanctions stricter or to keep the current 
sanctions in place. 
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country, for example, is looking for European solutions to overcome the sanctions, it points 
towards a neofunctionalist approach of European integration, since it sees sanctions as 
something to deal with on an international level.200 Comparing Finland and the Netherlands 
through this lens makes it possible to see whether there are clear differences between these 
two relatively small EU countries in dealing with sanctions, or whether both countries act 
despite their different relationship with Russia relatively the same. While the difference in 
main subcategories is made through a concept-driven method of constructing the coding 
frame, the smallest subcategories in this second dimension flow out of the data. 
Lastly, the fifth dimension of this QCA concerns the opinions of politicians on what 
role their country should play when sanctions are under discussion on the EU level. In other 
words, this dimension covers the behavior that politicians want their country to play in the 
international environment. This dimension relates closely to theory around EU integration and 
the behavior of small states within the EU. The dimension is divided into two main 
subcategories. The first subcategory concerns politicians wanting their country to behave in 
an assertive, intergovernmental way of sanctions. Within this subcategory, there is a division 
between the type of sanctions that politicians want to discuss on a central level. The second 
subcategory concerns wishes of politicians for reticent behavior of their country in EU 
discussions, which means that the government should stay on the background when sanctions 
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4. Scale/dealing with the sanctions  
a. National 
i. Support for domestic actors 
ii. Dialogue & diplomacy  




1. Dialogue & diplomacy 
2. Burden distribution 
3. Western compliance 
4. Other 
ii. Other / unclear 
1. Dialogue & diplomacy 
2. International agreements 
3. Other / unclear 
c. Both national and international / unclear 
 
Dimension 4. Scale / dealing with the sanctions. This dimension covers the level (national or international) 
on which parliamentarians want to deal with the current EU sanctions in place, and what steps they want to 




are under discussion. This subcategory comes forth out of supranational thought on European 
integration. The third dimension makes it possible to focus on the plurality of perspectives on 
wishes regarding sanctions, and whether smaller countries do see ways to change the general 
course of the EU. Thus, it shows if politicians in Finland and the Netherlands see ways of 
reaching agreement through bargaining, which is typical of the intergovernmental school of 
thought of European integration.201 It also unravels in what ways politicians see sanctions 
discussions more as a neofunctionalist matter, which entails a strong preference. Different 
than the second dimension of the coding frame, this dimension specifically focuses on 
preferences in EU discussions instead of differentiating between the national and international 
level. 
 In short, the coding frame in this study concerns five main dimensions, which each 
cover an important aspect of the main goals of this study. Dimensions one, four and five lay 
the groundwork for analyzing the opinions of politicians on the operation of sanctions and the 
underlying goals that politicians have in using sanctions regimes. The second dimension 
concerns how politicians want to deal with the sanctions in place and makes it possible to 
analyze the positioning of Finland and the Netherlands in the operation of sanctions. The third 
dimension specifically focuses on the role countries want to play within the EU, which gives 
an insight into how countries look at European integration. In the next chapter, this study 
looks at the results of the QCA and analyzes how these results reflect the literature presented 
in chapter 2. 
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5. Role in EU cooperation 
a. assertive (intergovernmental) 
i. block discussions on sanctions 
ii. support discussions on sanctions 
1. stricter sanctions 
2. keeping current sanctions 
3. softer sanctions 
4. other objectives 
b. reticent (supranational) 
i. United EU 
ii. Other 
 
 Dimension 5. Role in EU cooperation. This dimension covers what role politicians want their representatives 
to play when sanctions are under discussion in the EU. It thus covers the wishes for the behavior of a 
country within the EU. 
49 
 
4. Results and analysis of the QCA 
After a thorough selection of data, the construction of a coding frame, a pilot phase and the 
actual QCA, this chapter presents the results of the QCA following Schreier’s steps for 
conducting a successful QCA. The results in this chapter are presented in qualitative style by 
using continuous text. It describes cases illustrative for the categories in the coding frame, as 
well as relevant cases for the analysis. Since the dimensions and categories came into place by 
both concept-driven and data-driven methods, the results presented here combine both the 
coding frame and the units of analysis as a result. In other words, the coding frame itself is to 
some extent part of the result, along with the separate cases in the QCA. Even though this 
study is not a quantitative study, it does take the frequency of units of coding per category 
into account in analyzing the results. This is useful to understand whether certain opinions are 
widely supported, or whether only one party supports them.202 This chapter presents the 
results through the frame of the five different dimensions in this study, by distinguishing 
simultaneously how those dimensions are reflected in the results in Finland and in the 
Netherlands. The full coding results of the first and second coding, along with the final code, 
are in appendix 2. All units of coding combined with the final codes are attached in appendix 
3, coded in ATLAS.ti 9. 
 
4.1 Dimension 1. Sanctions continuation 
The first and most simple dimension, concerning sanctions continuation, brings a general idea 
of the opinions on sanctions in the given countries. In both the Netherlands and Finland, the 
first dimension is widely coded. This means that politicians do express their opinions on what 
they would like to happen with the sanctions that are in place. In assessing the continuation of 
sanctions, the dimension also explores if politicians explicitly or implicitly support this idea. 
 Most importantly, the codes in this dimension show that both countries lean strongly 
towards a continuation of the sanctions that are in place. Many politicians from both countries 
from both the government and opposition express that they “do not see any reason to lift the 
EU sanctions imposed”203. Others express that the sanctions in place “are their own part, and 
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they should not be touched”.204 Besides expressing it this clearly, politicians also state in 
implicit ways that sanctions should continue as they are: 
 
I believe that Russia's actions must not be accepted, and, as I said in my own speech earlier, I 
am not in favor of speeches – even we in this House – that talk for example about EU 
sanctions and that they should be abandoned.205 
 
Besides the wide number of politicians wanting to continue the sanctions as they are, several 
politicians in the Netherlands are calling for sanctions to become stricter, whereas not a single 
Finnish politician called for these in the documents under study. Most remarkable is that both 
government and opposition parties in the Netherlands call for stricter sanctions, both actively 
and in retrospect. Opposition parties are the sharpest in their opinions on stricter sanctions, by 
proposing motions for stricter sanctions in the debates. In the Dutch parliamentary system, 
members of parliament submit motions to express an opinion on government policy to do or 
not do something, or to make a general statement about matters under discussion. Motions are 
accepted or denied by voting.206 In these motions, parliamentarians call “on the government to 
advocate for additional sanctions on Russia (…) in the European Council”.207 None of these 
motions ever received a majority of the votes, however. In addition to opinions expressing 
stricter general sanctions, some call for specific sanctions. These concern economic, 
diplomatic and individual measures, as well as measures to prevent Russian financial support 
to Dutch political parties. 
 In the Finnish documents under study, a few units of coding show a desire to lift the 
sanctions in place. Remarkable is that these calls come from parties involved in the 
government. However, no politician directly calls for Finland to immediately lift all the 
sanctions. Instead, they state that sanctions should be lifted gradually; “by negotiating these 
sanctions on Russia with the EU, and bilaterally with Russia, we can gradually lift them.”208 
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 As regards to the general opinions on sanctions continuation, the documents show that 
politicians from different parties express that they directly or indirectly support the sanctions 
in place. In the Netherlands, some call for stricter sanctions, while some voices in Finland call 
for sanctions to be lifted. 
 
4.2 Dimension 2. Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions 
The second and third dimensions of the QCA go deeper into the reasons behind participation 
in sanctions regimes. In the second dimension, reasons to lift sanctions are under discussion. 
As became clear in the first dimension, almost no politicians are directly in favor of lifting all 
sanctions. However, some express a conditional wish for lifting the sanctions. This dimension 
takes all opinions leaning towards lifting sanctions into consideration. 
 In general, the QCA shows that Finnish politicians show a stronger desire for looking 
towards lifting the sanctions than their Dutch counterparts do. Reasons for Finnish politicians 
to address lifting the sanctions vary. An important reason for politicians to state intentions to 
work towards lifting the sanctions are economic reasons, a reason not mentioned by Dutch 
politicians. Many Finnish politicians, however, do not want to lift sanctions directly. Instead, 
they mention that Finland should be ready once sanctions can be lifted: “It is important (…) to 
wait for the day when the Russian food market opens up”.209 Some opposition politicians 
criticize Finland for agreeing on EU sanctions too quickly due to the economic impact, by 
criticizing Finland for being “the first model student to accept measures that affect the Finnish 
food industry the hardest”.210 One politician, from the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), argues 
for Finland leaving the EU. By doing so, sanctions could be lifted and the economic impact 
would be reduced: 
 
Leaving the EU would give back national decision-making power to agriculture as well. Trade 
with Russia is really important for agriculture, and Finland is a big victim because of the 
current sanctions.211 
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This statement fits the general line of the Finns Party, which has been described as “a constant 
promoter of organizational Euroscepticism”, which uses Euroscepticism as “a defining image 
of the party”. It is nonetheless interesting that a government party expresses such explicit 
language for leaving the EU, instead of phrasing it in different ways.212 
 Besides mentioning the economic impact as important for eventually lifting the 
sanctions, Finnish politicians also stress the importance of implementing the Minsk 
agreement. Some find it necessary to implement the complete agreement, by stating that “the 
uncompromising implementation of the Minsk agreement is the key to lifting sanctions”.213 
Some are less clear in whether the full agreement needs to be implemented before discussions 
about lifting the sanctions can start; according to these politicians, there needs to be 
“substantial progress”.214 
 Apart from the economic impact and the Minsk agreement, other reasons come to the 
foreground as well. Under category 2.d (general impact), politicians state as reasons to discuss 
how sanctions can be lifted the general impact on Finnish and Russian citizens, the unfair 
distribution of how sanctions hit EU countries, and the impact sanctions might have on the 
situation in Ukraine. In addition, the ineffectiveness of the sanctions in place (category 2.e) is 
mentioned as well. 
 The willingness of Dutch politicians to discuss lifting sanctions is weaker than in 
Finland. Many politicians stress the need to implement the Minsk agreement as the only 
reason to lift the sanctions in place. However, in the documents under study, firm discussions 
take place about the moment to start negotiations for lifting sanctions. One opposition party 
states that it is not needed to fulfill the complete Minsk agreement to lift sanctions: 
 
My line is that substantial steps need to be taken, such as withdrawing heavy weapons to the 
designated limits. I think that's a substantial step. That step has not yet been taken.215 
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In other words, according to some members of the opposition, a partial implementation of the 
Minsk agreement should lead to opening talks on lifting sanctions. However, both 
government and other opposition parties disagree with this stance.  
Nevertheless, a member of one of the two government parties expresses that sanctions 
could be partially lifted to reach other objectives, for example related to the war in Syria. This 
is important, because it surpasses the Minsk agreement completely. It is noted that “if the 
sanctions are eased, the Russians will have to pay a very high price”, but one of the two 
government parties leaves this option as a possible way to lift sanctions.216 
In short, some overlap is detectable in approach to coming closer to lifting sanctions in 
the Netherlands and Finland. In both countries, politicians support the full implementation of 
the Minsk agreement as reason to lift sanctions. However, in both places, there are politicians 
in favor of gradually lifting the sanctions when the Minsk agreement is partially implemented. 
Besides the Minsk agreement, many Finnish politicians stress the impact of sanctions on both 
the economy and the country in general as important reasons to work towards lifting the 
sanctions. Remarkably, despite the economic impact sanctions have on the Netherlands as 
well, politicians do not consider it insofar important to argue that it is a reason to work 
towards lifting sanctions. 
 
4.3 Dimension 3. Reasons for implementing new or upholding existing sanctions 
The third dimension shows different reasons for politicians to support existing sanctions 
regimes, as well as reasons to implement stricter sanctions. This dimension is the most 
extensive dimension of the coding frame in this study. Since many politicians express support 
for upholding sanctions, as shown in dimension 1, it is perhaps unsurprising that the reasons 
for upholding sanctions are frequently coded. On the other hand, since no Finnish politician is 
in favor of stricter sanctions (see dimension 1.a.i & 1.a.ii), the categories under 3.a of this 
dimension only includes codes from Dutch politicians. 
 In coming up with stricter sanctions on Russia, most politicians in the Netherlands see 
new reasons as main driver to implement additional sanctions. These reasons concern for 
example the suspected involvement of Russia in the downing of flight MH-17, which in 2014 
already led to a second wave of sanctions, including strong economic sanctions.217 However, 
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according to some opposition politicians in the Netherlands, these sanctions are not enough. 
They state that “after the Joint Investigation Team demonstrated Russian involvement, the 
cabinet should have expelled the Russian ambassador and implemented tougher economic 
sanctions”.218 
 Another major reason for many Dutch politicians to argue for stricter sanctions is the 
involvement of Russia in the war in Syria, of which they criticize Russian involvement in 
bombings. In category 3.a.i.1, it is remarkable that politicians from both opposition and 
government parties give Syria as reason to implement stricter sanctions. Besides arguing for 
stricter sanctions, one of opposition politicians argues for stricter sanctions through a motion, 
which was not accepted by the parliament: 
 
Noting that Russia very recently vetoed a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for an 
end to the bombing of Aleppo in Syria and a ceasefire to allow humanitarian aid; calls on the 
government to advocate additional sanctions on Russia on behalf of the European Union in the 
European Council on 20 and 21 October 2016.219 
 
In addition to direct support for stricter sanctions, it is curious that politicians from different 
sides argue that sanctions should have been implemented earlier. A politician from one of the 
government parties states that “threats for stricter sanctions should have been made”.220 
 Besides new reasons for having sanctions, Dutch politicians also note the 
ineffectiveness or limited effect of the current sanctions as reason to implement stricter 
sanctions. Some politicians seem convinced of the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia: 
 
It is precisely the pressure on Russia, for example with the possibility of doing more with 
sanctions, that makes the Russians sit down at the table and not - just to bring out those peace 
symbols that Mr. Van Bommel is once again exhibiting today - to take those sanctions off the 
table?221 
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In addition to politicians from government parties, opposition politicians also support this 
stance. They state for example that “the sanctions we have imposed as a result of the situation 
in eastern Ukraine have worked quite well”, as a justification for stricter sanctions.222 Lastly, 
in addition to the mentioned reasons, some argue that sanctions should be implemented to 
ensure security in the EU, as well as for the prevention of future escalations. 
 In reasons for upholding existing sanctions, there are both differences and similarities 
between the Netherlands and Finland. Politicians express that they want to keep the current 
sanctions in place in different ways, posing different reasons as well. Showing support for 
sanctions is done in explicit and implicit ways, as is highlighted in the first dimension. In 
some cases, it is clear that the discussion is about implementing stricter sanctions. This causes 
that some politicians express their implicit support for sanctions; they do not directly express 
that they are in favor of upholding sanctions, but give reasons why they do not want to 
implement stricter sanctions.  
As comes to the foreground in reasons to lift sanctions, the Minsk agreement is also a 
reason to keep the current sanctions in place. Many express that “in view of the fact that the 
Minsk agreements are not going anywhere, it seems to me that there can be no question of 
easing sanctions”.223 At the same time, several Finnish politicians stress that besides being in 
favor of the sanctions, they want the situation to “get back on the path to the Minsk 
agreement”.224 In other words, they highlight in a stronger way than their Dutch counterparts 
that something needs to be done in order to fulfill the Minsk agreement, instead of leaning 
back and looking that nothing has been done. 
Tied to continuing the sanctions because of the Minsk agreement are the reasons given 
in the categories under 3.b.iii, concerning continued involvement in existing conflicts. These 
conflicts were the initial trigger for implementing sanctions, making it unsurprising that this is 
given as a reason to continue sanctions. Those expressing their support for upholding 
sanctions and posing continued involvement in the Ukraine conflict (category 3.b.iii.1) pose 
statement such as “sanctions are their own thing and should not be touched until we have 
peace in eastern Ukraine and the situation on Crimea is resolved”.225 In the Netherlands, some 
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opposition politicians raise MH17 as reason to uphold the sanctions. Government parties, 
however, express that “the current sanctions package has nothing to do (…) with MH17”.226 
Other reasons expressed in both the Netherlands and Finland are about security 
concerns. These concerns apply to Ukraine, the EU, as well as the domestic sphere. In 
concerns about Ukraine, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs states for example that “we 
must not lose sight of the humanitarian consequences of this conflict. We must not let Ukraine 
fall”.227 Between the Netherlands and Finland, there are visible differences in category 
3.b.iv.1 about domestic or EU security concerns. Dutch politicians focus more on concerns 
about the EU in general, noting that the behavior of Russia close to the borders of the EU 
threatens the security of the EU. When expressing security concerns, Finnish politicians add 
besides a threat to the EU more focus to domestic security concerns by adding, for example, 
that this “security tension is also reflected in the Baltic Sea region”.228 
In Finnish discussions on sanctions, strategic culture is mentioned as a reason to keep 
existing sanctions in place. Several politicians raise that Finland has always been an actor in 
international relations that bases its identity on sticking to international agreements and law. 
For some, this perceived ‘traditional’ role is important in keeping sanctions in place: 
 
We are known around the world for the fact that when we commit to an agreement, we abide 
by it and also require others to abide by it. It is part of our identity, and every foreign decision-
maker and person who deals with us knows that it is an important part of Finnish politics.229 
 
Others note the traditional role of Finland as a bridge-builder, emphasizing that Finland 
should behave as a country bridging the gap between Russia on the one hand and the Western 
world on the other hand. Timo Heinonen, for example, finds that “it has been positive that, in 
accordance with a long tradition, Finland has played a very important role here as a bridge 
builder (…) held consultations and discussions and, above all, opened that dialogue”.230 
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Several politicians thus highlight the role that Finland has played in international relations 
with Russia in the past as reason to continue with sanctions. 
 Besides reasons to support sanctions continuation explicitly, reasons for implicitly 
supporting sanctions come to the foreground in the data as well. This implicit support is 
mainly clear in discussions in the Netherlands, where some are in favor of stricter sanctions. 
As counterargument for stricter sanctions, many parliamentarians state that they find stricter 
sanctions counterproductive or ineffective. Illustrative for the ineffectiveness is this reaction 
from a member of the government as reaction to an opposition politician: 
 
I am not very confident that it will lead to any behavioral change. On the contrary, it will 
probably strengthen their counter policy, because the very introduction of the sanctions has led 
to the Russian reaction: we do not want to work with you because you anyways imposed 
sanctions. We do not have to adapt to this completely, but I do have doubts about the 
effectiveness of additional sanctions. However, I say again tonight, that I do not rule out 
anything.231 
 
The reason to be against additional sanctions, thus, is that they are supposedly 
counterproductive. Some members of parliament go even further and state that EU sanctions 
only escalate the situation more: “we have seen that strong language towards Putin only 
makes that we escalate things further”.232 
 In addition to not implement different sanctions for (in)effectivity reasons, politicians 
in both the Netherlands and Finland state that the same sanctions regime should be prolonged 
to ensure a united EU. In Finnish debates, this is mainly expressed in that despite the fact that 
Finland looks to increase dialogue, it is “strongly behind the EU’s common foreign policy – 
including its sanctions decisions”.233 Several politicians stress the strong support for the 
united EU policies, and find it important to continue with it. Dutch politicians also stress the 
importance of keeping the EU united in sanctions decisions. According to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, “the most important thing in Europe is that the European Union remains a 
                                                     
231 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Kamerstuk 21501-02 Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse 
Zaken,” Handeling 2016-2017, no. 1686, October 5, 2016 (published October 30, 2016): 14, 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1686.html.  
232 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Debat over Syrië,” Handeling 2016-2017, no. 38, item 10, December 
21, 2016 (published January 6, 2017): 9, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-38-10.html. 




unity”.234 Another member of the government parties finds it even dangerous to do anything 
else than prolonging the sanctions that are in place; “It seems to me extremely harmful and a 
great victory for Russia if Europe were to have a whole discussion about sanctions for the 
action in Syria and if it subsequently failed”.235 
 In short, politicians in both the Netherlands and Finland pose different reasons for 
continuing with the sanctions in place, or actively supporting stricter EU sanctions on Russia. 
No Finnish politician expresses support for stricter sanctions, whereas Dutch parliamentarians 
want stricter sanctions as punishment for new actions of Russia, ineffective existing sanctions, 
security concerns or prevention of future escalations. In upholding the sanctions in place, 
politicians in both of the countries under study have partly similar reasons to continue; the 
Minsk agreement, continued involvement in conflicts, EU unity and security concerns. 
However, politicians mention strongly differing reasons as well, such as strategic culture in 
Finland. In the Netherlands, the counterproductive effect of different sanctions and the 
involvement in the downing of flight MH-17 are also important reasons to keep the sanctions 
in place.  
 
4.4 Dimension 4. Scale/dealing with the sanctions 
The fourth dimension, focusing on both the scale to deal with the sanctions in place as well as 
what to do during the current measures, shows clear differences in the approach to dealing 
with the sanctions in place. In the coding, the general opinion on whether sanctions should 
continue is not taken into account. This dimension considers both the national and the 
international aspect, through which it is possible to analyze what role both countries see 
themselves play in the international sphere. This dimension does not focus solely on the EU 
level; the fifth dimension, focusing on the role of countries in EU cooperation when sanctions 
are under discussion, gives a fuller view of the role of Finland and the Netherlands on the 
European level. 
 The results of the coding of this dimension shows that Finnish politicians have a 
strong determination to do something with the current sanctions in place. On the national 
level, politicians see several steps focal points to take into account. Firstly, it is clear that 
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politicians want to find solutions for the domestic actors hit by sanctions. Politicians from 
different sides stress that domestic actors suffered from the sanctions and need help: 
 
The acute problems of agriculture (…) are not the fault of farmers. Countersanctions tied to 
EU sanctions imposed by Russia are reflected in farmer’s livelihoods. We must take 
responsibility for the effects of sanctions, they should not be pushed to one professional 
group.236 
 
Besides supporting domestic actors, Finnish politicians also strongly stress the need for 
dialogue and diplomacy with Russia, both on a bilateral as well as an international level. 
Politicians mention that “Finland should do everything in its power to promote (…) political 
dialogue and diplomacy, for many reasons, not only because of the general security situation 
but also because of its own security policy.”237 Many stress that even though Finland supports 
the general EU line, it is important to continue the relatively good relationship with Russia. In 
addition, all politicians in the documents under study support high political meetings between 
Russia and Finland, for example between the president of Russia and the president of Finland. 
 Finnish politicians also find it important to take measures to ensure that the “Western” 
side complies with sanctions, which is expressed by criticism on Finland as well as on 
Ukraine. They do not specifically criticize other the behavior of other EU countries in sticking 
to the sanctions regimes. An important moment in which the internal dynamics become clear 
is in the strong reaction of politicians to a statement of the Finnish Minister of Foreign affairs, 
who stated that Crimea was a lost case. In addition, politicians from different parties express 
that Finland needs to support Ukraine in complying with the sanctions. The importance of 
dealing with sanctions on a national level is also stressed in the codes under 2.a.iv. Some 
parties express the importance of not surpassing the national parliament when sanctions are 
under discussion on a European level. 
 Besides an active way of dealing with the sanctions on a national level, Finnish 
parliamentarians also see ways to deal with sanctions on an international scale. In supporting 
dialogue and diplomacy, they state for example that “even if it seems distant, it is in Finland’s 
interest to eventually get Russia back into normal relations with the EU”.238 In addition, 
Finnish politicians express the need for the EU to distribute the burden of sanctions more 
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evenly across the EU member states. As one of the politicians from the government parties 
expresses it: 
 
And now that the situation has dragged on and may continue to go on for a long time, has 
there been - in my opinion there should be - a debate within the EU on these burden-sharing 
issues, so that European countries can bear the burden of these sanctions more evenly?239 
 
Finnish politicians thus express support for dealing with the sanctions on an international 
level through dialogue, diplomacy, and burden distribution. However, they do not express 
much need to discuss Western compliance on a European scale. This is remarkable, since they 
do stress this as important when discussing sanctions on a national level. Lastly, several 
Finnish parliamentarians express the importance of following international agreements. As 
stated by a politician part of a government party, “it is particularly important that small 
countries comply with the agreements.”240  
 In the Netherlands, as opposed to Finland, dealing with sanctions on a national level is 
not discussed as vividly. Both governmental and opposition parties agree that diplomatic 
relations with Russia should be maintained, but draw stronger conditions than their Finnish 
counterparts do. They state that diplomacy should go hand in hand with a strict policy towards 
Russia; “respect is of course achieved through serious diplomacy (…) but above all with 
muscles and the fist of economic sanctions”.241 Some opposition parliamentarians raise the 
question of Western compliance, and urge the government to pressure Ukraine to stick to the 
Minsk agreement. They want this pressure to both come from the Netherlands bilaterally as 
well as from the EU. However, not many politicians echo this urge to put pressure on 
Ukraine. While they note that Ukraine does not comply completely, they do not express that 
something should actively be done about it. Peculiar is that, differently than in Finland, 
support for domestic actors suffering from sanctions has not been under discussion at all in 
parliamentary debates in 2016. 
 Internationally, Dutch politicians express different ways to deal with the sanctions. 
Within the EU specifically, they do not actively express much about ways to deal with the 
sanctions in place. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as domestic actors do not seem to be under 
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discussion, Dutch politicians do not talk about burden distribution within the EU. 
Nevertheless, they express international dealing with the sanctions in place also through other 
international systems, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN. In 
the units coded, politicians express that they are in favor of keeping talks open through these 
organizations. However, it is noticeable that these talks should always take place in a wider 
international context; wide support is given to talks under the flag of NATO, or in cooperation 
with countries such as France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, “to 
determine a firm position vis-à-vis the Russian Federation”.242 
 In short, Finland and the Netherlands do have different ways to deal with the sanctions 
in place. Finland looks for solutions in the domestic sphere, by supporting domestic actors, 
keeping a strong dialogue with Russia and by making sure that they themselves also comply 
with the agreements made. Internationally, Finnish politicians look for ways to establish 
dialogue and to foster diplomacy with Russia, while they also look for burden distribution to 
spread the impact of the current sanctions in the EU more evenly. Dutch politicians, on the 
other hand, express dealing with the sanctions in different ways. In general, a domestic way to 
deal with the impact sanctions is less under discussion than in Finland. While Dutch 
politicians support the idea of keeping diplomatic channels with Russia open, they often do so 
in cooperation with international institutions. This cooperation happens besides the EU 
through other organizations as well, such as NATO. 
 
4.5 Dimension 5. Role in EU cooperation 
The fifth and last dimension of the coding frame is the dimension most focused on how 
politicians of EU member states look at the role their country plays in the international 
framework. It specifically looks at the way Dutch and Finnish politicians want their 
government to act when sanctions are under discussion on a European level. As sanctions 
need to be prolonged on a regular basis, it is regularly under discussion what member states 
want to reach in these meetings.243 This dimension takes into account what type of objectives 
politicians want their governments to reach in assertive EU cooperation, as well as objectives 
for reticent behavior in EU cooperation. By combining the results from the second and third 
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dimension, it is possible to analyze what roles Finnish and Dutch politicians see fit for their 
countries in European cooperation. 
Both Dutch and Finnish politicians see different roles for their government to play 
when sanctions are under discussion in the EU. Most Finnish politicians do not give strong 
opinions on whether their government should support discussions for stricter, softer or the 
same sanctions in the EU. Unsurprisingly, no Finnish politicians are looking for their 
government to promote stricter sanctions, which is in line with the Finnish opinions on 
sanctions in dimension 1. Some politicians from government parties express indirect ways to 
lift some sanctions in EU discussions, by stating that the line of the government in the EU will 
be that “sanctions are too harsh”.244 Remarkably many Finnish politicians do not directly 
want Finland to say something about the current sanctions in place, but stimulate Finland to 
achieve other objectives in sanctions discussions in the EU (category 5.a.ii.4). Some call for 
discussions to assess the current sanctions, while others look for an exit strategy to sanctions. 
Several argue for discussions on burden distribution, which relates to the findings in 
dimension 4. 
In the Netherlands, some politicians from the opposition have stronger opinions on 
what their country should do in EU discussions about stricter, similar, or softer sanctions. 
Especially those in favor of stricter sanctions find that the Netherlands should be assertive in 
the EU. For different reasons, they urge the government to open the discussion on stricter 
sanctions by asking if they will pressure the EU to do so. MP Louis Bontes, for example, sees 
a wide support in the Dutch parliament for stricter sanctions: 
 
My question is then: can the sanctions (…) not be extended? I also heard this reflected in the 
contributions by MP Omtzigt and from MP Verhoeven. They, too, are urging for more 
pressure, for an intensification of sanctions. Is there any way to address this to the colleagues 
in Brussels?245 
 
Most politicians supporting discussions in the EU about stricter sanctions note that it is 
unlikely that the EU agrees on stricter sanctions. Nevertheless, they still argue that it is 
important to have a discussion on it. In addition to support for stricter sanctions, politicians 
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from both the opposition and governmental parties stress the need for the Netherlands to be 
assertive in discussions about the continuation of the sanctions in place. 
Politicians from both countries express worries about the unity of the EU, which 
makes that a few units of coding in both Finland and the Netherlands voices show politicians 
calling for blocking sanctions discussions. When having a discussion on sanctions, these 
politicians argue that it is dangerous for EU unity. For the same reason, the units of coding in 
category 5.b.i (reticent – united EU) show that especially many Dutch politicians are in favor 
of a reticent stance in the EU, meaning that they hold back on criticism. They do so to make 
sure that the EU stays united. In this case, it is noteworthy that only government parties call 
for this reticent stance. In the debates involved in this study, they often respond to politicians 
looking to initiate sanctions discussions in the EU. As Han ten Broeke, a politician from one 
of the two governmental parties in the Netherlands, states: 
 
If the Netherlands on its own argues for something that is not going to happen, you will only 
demonstrate once again that the European Union cannot reach agreement on this. So, the 
method might be sympathetic, but failure is possibly just as damaging.246 
 
In another debate, the Dutch prime minister states that “as a national government you cannot 
say: this is what I think. I have just said that it is important that Europe speaks with one 
voice”.247 In the Finnish documents under study, the opinion on refraining from sanctions 
discussions in the EU is less on the foreground, likely because of the fact that most politicians 
do not want Finland to take a stronger stance in the EU. However, in some codes, politicians 
from government parties express their disagreement with discussing sanctions on a wider 
scale. In a few cases, they do so as response to voices in the EU calling for sanctions 
discussions by stating for example: “I believe that this is not the way to go (…) we, as the EU 
and all the other countries, must be together to condemn the annexation of Crimea”.248 
 In short, politicians from the Netherlands and Finland have both similar and different 
opinions on what their country should do in sanctions discussions. In the Netherlands, this 
dimension shows a clear divide between opposition parties and parties in the government. 
Where opposition parties want the Netherlands to clearly state their opinion in Europe, the 
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government is more hesitant to do so with the argument that EU unity should be preserved. In 
Finland, several politicians want to discuss the sanctions in the EU, but mainly to look for 
ways to achieve other objectives than purely a change of the sanctions regime in place. 
Instead of assertively trying to change the sanctions package in place, Finnish politicians 






So far, this work has focused on a discussion of theory, the research design and the results of 
the QCA on Dutch and Finnish parliamentary documents. These different elements all 
contribute to getting an understanding of the dynamics of sanctions in EU member states and 
the influence of these countries on the operation of sanctions. By investigating how politicians 
want their countries to maneuver themselves within the EU, this study adds to the academic 
debate on how EU members look towards European integration and how EU sanctions are 
prolonged. This research makes a start in understanding how smaller countries influence EU 
sanctions and what politicians consider as important when sanctions prolonging is on the 
table. This fifth chapter analyzes the results of the QCA presented in chapter 4 in more detail 
and considers them in light of the theory presented in chapter 2. First, the discussion 
concentrates on the way sanctions policy is reflected in Finland and the Netherlands. I argue 
that politicians in these countries show clear differences in their reasons and objectives for 
participating in sanctions regimes. However, both countries eventually align in supporting the 
continuation of signaling sanctions. The second part of the discussion sheds light on the way 
these countries position themselves in the international context, mainly focusing on their 
behavior within the EU. As I argue, both the Netherlands and Finland maneuver themselves in 
a way closely aligned with postfunctionalist theory on European integration. Nevertheless, 
both countries are not as united as they may present themselves, which could cause friction in 
future discussions. 
 
5.1 Dynamics of sanctions policy in different member states  
Both the data and context parts in this study show that EU sanctions on Russia affect Finland 
and the Netherlands in different manners. The different relationship with Russia with regard 
to, for example, history, economy and geographical location, makes it not surprising that 
reasons to participate in sanctions regimes are distinctive in different EU countries. Despite 
differences on the domestic level, however, since 2014 all countries in the EU unanimously 
and continuously agree on upholding the sanctions on Russia. They do so until at least the end 
of 2021.249 The QCA in this study shows that this joint approach is below the surface not 
always self-evident. In prolonging sanctions in the Netherlands and Finland, several 
mechanisms play a role that make both countries comply with the EU; however, it is at the 
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same time important to identify differences in these countries for understanding how 
sanctions are eventually prolonged. In general, Finland is a country that is more leaning 
towards softer sanctions, while several politicians in the Netherlands want to implement 
stricter sanctions. As this section shows, these differences align with a part of the sanctions 
theory, while both countries also show similarities in prolonging signaling sanctions.  
In Finland, many politicians highlight the economic impact of sanctions on important 
sectors in the country. In their opinions on sanctions, some express these as a driver for 
attempting to make the impact of sanctions lighter. These attempts result in politicians 
discussing support packages for these sectors, but also make that some argue for lifting the 
sanctions sooner rather than later. Many express their concerns about the position of Finnish 
farmers, of whom some were before 2014 heavily dependent on export to Russia. A way to 
explain why Finnish politicians do not want to impose stricter sanctions or work towards 
lifting the sanctions is through the logic of interdependence. This logic assumes that when 
countries have close economic relations, the willingness to implement sanctions is less.250 In 
expressing economic ties as reason to make the impact of sanctions lighter, the difference 
with the Netherlands is striking. The logic of interdependence partly explains this difference; 
as shown, the Netherlands is less dependent on trade with Russia. Therefore, it is less likely 
that politicians express their concern about the influence of sanctions on their economy. It is 
nevertheless remarkable that politicians do not discuss the impact on Dutch sectors at all, 
given that Dutch exports to Russia suffered from sanctions as well, albeit less than in Finland. 
In contrast to Finland, some politicians in the Netherlands go even as far as wanting 
stricter sanctions. This is explainable by the theory of ‘more pain, more gain’.251 In their view, 
the only way to make Russia comply is by implementing stricter sanctions, which then work 
in a constraining way. The objective in these sanctions is not to make Russia do something 
that they otherwise would not start doing, as is the case in Lukes’ decision-making power.252 
Alternatively, the goal is to make Russia stop doing something that is already happening, as 
for example applies to sanctions tied to bombings in Syria. Despite several politicians actively 
trying to implement sanctions in the Netherlands, most politicians in the Netherlands do not 
eventually vote for stricter sanctions. Instead, they want to keep the sanctions in place. Thus, 
while the theories of economic interdependence and ‘more pain, more gain’ in domestic 
reasons for participating in EU sanctions on Russia have their impact, it is at the same time 
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clear that these theories are not the key factor in implementing new or lifting the existing 
sanctions when prolonging is under discussion. In the end, notwithstanding firm discussions, 
most Finnish and Dutch politicians see sanctions continuation as the right way to move on. 
In analyzing how sanctions mechanisms work in these countries, therefore, it is 
necessary to look further than solely the economic impact, which sanctions theory discussed 
in chapter 2 suggests as well. In general, as shown in the context section (2.1.3), EU sanctions 
on Russia are implemented with the idea of constraining and coercing Russia for its 
involvement in the crisis in Ukraine in 2014. On the one hand, there was the broadly 
supported idea for stopping Russia in its exercise of power in Ukraine, which comprises 
constraining sanctions. On the other hand, at the same time there was a desire to get Russia 
out of Ukraine altogether, which comprises coercing sanctions.253 In the documents from 
2016, the exercise of power expressed by Finnish and Dutch politicians for participating in 
sanctions policy differs significantly, when purely looking at the way they want to use 
different types of power. As becomes clear from the QCA results, several Dutch politicians 
see new sanctions as a punishment for Russian behavior in new conflicts. In their ideas on 
sanctions, they highlight the expectation that Russian involvement can be stopped by using 
different kinds of power. In the best scenario, Russia will do something that they otherwise 
would not do, but the rock-bottom objective is making sure that certain new strategic moves 
by Russia are not taken. In other words, these politicians try to use decision-making power 
and agenda-setting power in constructing sanctions policies.254 In addition, the data in the 
QCA is noteworthy in that some express regret that sanctions were not imposed earlier, as 
reaction to previous developments. This shows a retrospective idea of constraining sanctions, 
which should have stopped attempts to implement new policies. 
In the reasons given for implementing these stricter sanctions, aspects of the naïve 
theory by Galtung are clearly visible.255 As shown in the fourth chapter, politicians from both 
the government and the opposition state that previous sanctions on Russia have worked very 
well. However, as discussed in chapter 2, the effect of a retreat of Russia from Ukraine or of 
domestic political disintegration has not occurred. In implementing stricter sanctions, thus, 
one could state that these politicians do this in a “naïve” way, meaning that instead of 
reaching compliance they reach the opposite. This is because the objectives they state for 
sanctions, comprising a change of behavior concerning flight MH-17 and the war in Syria, 
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have not been reached in previous sanctions regimes. While some could look at these 
expressions as naïve, it can also point to objectives that are different from purely constraining 
or coercing. The objectives of these politicians for implementing stricter sanctions thus do not 
align with the official goals of the sanctions in place. Rather, the reasons for politicians to 
argue for these stricter sanctions need to be based on different objectives. 
In the Finnish documents under study, no parliamentarian is in favor of implementing 
stricter sanctions. To the contrary, some politicians express a desire to lift sanctions as soon as 
they see progress in the situation. Most state, however, that they support the current sanctions 
in place. Noticeable is that many Finnish politicians express a wish to establish dialogue with 
Russia. This behavior is instead of exercising coercing or constraining sanctions, which Dutch 
politicians express, closer towards signaling sanctions; the current sanctions express a 
message, but there is no active attempt to implement sanctions triggering a behavioral change 
of Russia. 
So far, this chapter has focused on analyzing how and for what reasons politicians 
want their country to participate in sanctions regimes, and what type of sanctions these 
politicians are actually looking for. As becomes clear from the QCA results, several Dutch 
politicians seem to have a stance that is stricter towards the sanctions policy in place. At the 
same time, many support the sanctions in place for, as they express it, constraining and 
coercing objectives. Finnish politicians, on the other hand, see the sanctions in place as 
draining on the country and do not attempt to strengthen constraining and coercing objectives 
of sanctions. Despite these differences and opposition to the current sanctions, it is important 
to note that politicians in Finland and the Netherlands generally show support for existing 
sanctions. Based on the analysis of the results and theory so far, this united stance does not 
necessarily flow logically out of the effects sanctions have on the different countries. In 
addition, the agreement on how to continue with sanctions does not necessarily align with the 
opinions expressed either. The question that remains, then, is how both countries decide to 
comply with the sanctions in place. 
 On the surface, in their strong support for upholding the existing sanctions because of 
the Minsk agreement and the continued involvement of Russia in the conflict in Ukraine, 
there seems to be a strong support for a constraining type of sanctions in the Netherlands and 
Finland. In the beginning, these sanctions started as how Giumelli describes constraining 
sanctions. However, the results of the QCA show that to some extent these have evolved into 
signaling sanctions as well. In expressions of both Finnish and Dutch politicians, there is little 
doubt about sticking to the Minsk agreement, even when some note that the chance that the 
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Minsk agreement is complied with is very small. In a way, by continuing the sanctions when 
they do not seem to have the effect previously hoped for, they evolve into a signaling type of 
sanctions showing disapproval of certain behavior. As the situation does not actively change 
anymore, thus, formerly constraining sanctions change into signaling sanctions. Despite the 
strong differences in expressing opinions, therefore, the objective of sanctions is thus at least 
partly the same in the Netherlands and Finland; both countries use signaling sanctions.256 
One of the possible explanations for the agreement of keeping current sanctions in 
place is through constructivist theory of compliance with international agreements. This 
theory assumes that states follow a logic of appropriateness in their policies, which is the idea 
that they have to do something because it is morally right.257 In explaining why politicians 
support signaling sanctions despite good reasons to change them, this theory is useful. When 
politicians talk about security concerns as reasons to uphold the existing sanctions, for 
example, the logic of appropriateness is applicable. Some politicians express the feeling that 
something needs to be done in order to support Ukraine, while others express that upholding 
the sanctions sends a signal that the border regions of the EU are being protected. In Finland, 
upholding signaling sanctions for moral reasons also is visible in reasons to continue with 
sanctions because of the country’s strategic culture. This stress on strategic culture is a good 
example of using sanctions to create a certain norm, namely the norm of a rights-respecting 
country working as a bridge-builder between East and West. Finnish politicians express this 
identity as their ‘traditional’ role. Thus, in a way, both countries partly overlap in what kind 
of sanctions they support, while some politicians at the same time maintain strong differences 
in their approach to sanctions. 
In short, reasons and objectives in sanctions policies are both different and similar in 
the Netherlands and Finland. Finnish politicians, on the one hand, mostly want to keep the 
current sanctions in place or try to find solutions for making the impact of sanctions lighter. 
This is partly explained through the logic of interdependence, but this logic does not tell the 
complete story. In their exercise of power through sanctions, Finnish politicians often express 
a preference for establishing dialogue, meaning that power is not used to change certain 
behavior; instead, signaling sanctions are enough. Dutch politicians generally take a stricter 
stance regarding EU sanctions on Russia, but do eventually support prolonging the current 
sanctions without arguing for new sanctions packages. In their sanctions objectives, several 
Dutch politicians argue for coercing and constraining sanctions, despite the perceived naïve 
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way of dealing with the sanctions. Eventually, however, most politicians in both Finland and 
the Netherlands agree on the continuation sanctions without attempting to actively change the 
current package. As argued, throughout the years of this package of sanctions being in place, 
the objectives behind sanctions have moved for both countries towards signaling sanctions. 
Other reasons for complying can be normative, which is explainable through constructivist 
theory on sanctions.  
 
5.2 Small-state positioning on the international (EU) level  
What remains is the question how countries deal with the current sanctions in place and how 
politicians want their country to behave on an international level. This discussion section goes 
deeper into the positioning of Dutch and Finnish politicians within EU integration theories, as 
well as a discussion on the general role of “smaller” states in the CFSP of the EU. As this 
section shows, both the Netherlands and Finland prefer an approach towards sanctions typical 
for smaller states in the EU; they generally consider the EU as the main decision-making 
body, without attempting to put forward their own wishes too strongly. Of the EU integration 
theories under discussion, I argue, this aligns most closely with postfunctionalist ideas of 
European integration. 
 In dealing with the existing sanctions in place (dimension 4), Finland and the 
Netherlands both look for different solutions. Finland is looking actively for ways to deal with 
the impact of sanctions, while Dutch politicians discuss this less actively. These differences 
are visible on both the national and international level. In Finland, many debates concerning 
sanctions discuss the impact of sanctions on the national scale. The main way to deal with this 
impact is by discussing support packages for domestic actors. When discussing ways to deal 
with sanctions on the international level, Finnish politicians often highlight that the impact of 
sanctions is unevenly distributed among EU states. The QCA results show that in attempting 
to distribute its impact more evenly, several Finnish politicians want burden distribution 
measures from the EU. When sanctions are under discussion on the EU level, this is the main 
topic that Finnish politicians want to put forward. However, this attempt to achieve objectives 
on the EU level does not culminate into a strong desire to change the main cause of the 
burden on Finland. Instead, as the QCA results show, Finnish politicians do not want their 
country to proactively argue for changing the existing sanctions. The behavior concerning 
burden distribution fits somewhat into an idea of European integration from the perspective of 
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new intergovernmentalism; politicians try to put their national interests forward and stimulate 
their government to engage in EU sanctions discussions to achieve burden distribution.258  
However, the absence of an active discussion on wanting to change EU sanctions is 
remarkable, since this change is needed to stop the unfair burden in the first place. Thus, 
while Finnish politicians express their desire to achieve objectives on the European level, they 
simultaneously refrain from doing so. This fits into a postfunctionalist idea of European 
integration as well; while sanctions are accepted with skepticism domestically, the decisions 
are made on a centralized level. According to postfunctionalists, this is potentially disruptive, 
leading to weaker preferences for integration.259 In their ways of dealing with the sanctions in 
place, some of these weaker preferences for integration come to the foreground. This is 
especially visible in, as the QCA results show, the strong Finnish preference for bilateral 
dialogue and diplomacy between Finland and Russia; instead of establishing this on a 
European level, Finnish politicians want to do this on the national level. 
 As opposed to their Finnish counterparts, Dutch politicians do not discuss dealing with 
sanctions on a national level as vividly. In dealing with the sanctions, they argue that dialogue 
and diplomacy with Russia should be maintained. Instead of looking for this proactively, as 
Finnish politicians want to, they want dialogue to go hand in hand with strict policies. 
Internationally, most remarkable is that Dutch politicians look for ways to deal with sanctions 
that are besides the EU level also on the scale of NATO and the UN. Noticeable is that Dutch 
politicians do not enthusiastically support the establishment of bilateral dialogues between the 
Netherlands and Russia. This is partly explainable through the impact of flight MH-17, which 
clearly influences Dutch stances towards cooperation with Russia. In dealing with the 
sanctions in place, thus, Dutch politicians see a supranational way of establishing dialogue as 
the right way to go. 
 When Dutch politicians discuss Dutch stances in sanctions discussions on the 
European level, there are significant differences visible within Dutch domestic politics. Some 
opposition politicians, as the QCA results show, want the Dutch government to actively open 
discussions on stricter sanctions in the EU. These politicians, looking for new coercing 
sanctions, approach EU sanctions in alignment with new intergovernmentalist theory on EU 
integration. Even though they understand that their opinions do not receive support in the EU, 
they still want the Netherlands to express them internationally. According to these politicians, 
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state preferences can be clearly distinguished in EU cooperation, resulting in a bargaining 
way of achieving consensus.260  
Other politicians, including the ministers responsible in the government, express a 
very different approach to EU cooperation in sanctions. Many refuse the idea that the 
Netherlands should independently open EU discussions on sanctions, noting the importance 
of EU unity. According to them, the most important way of upholding sanctions effectively is 
by not showing any disagreement within the EU. This results in some politicians wanting to 
block sanctions discussions in the EU, while others find it enough to express their approval of 
the current sanctions in EU discussions. Even when these politicians express the need to do 
something about Russian behavior, they do not support stricter sanctions because it might 
disrupt EU unity. The majority of Dutch politicians support this stance. By going in this way, 
politicians thus go about sanctions in a way that is best explained through the 
postfunctionalist theory of European integration. While there is dissatisfaction with the 
sanctions in place, which could be called “constraining dissensus”, they still support the 
centralized approach for going about the sanctions.261 As the Netherlands is not strong enough 
to change the general policy, they decide to stick to the general EU approach, which is in line 
with theory on the behavior of small countries.262 
Despite domestic differences in preferences for dealing with sanctions on the EU 
level, thus, the eventual stance towards changing sanctions in both Finland and the 
Netherlands is limited. Seen through European integration theory, the positions of both 
countries are explainable through a postfunctionalist lens: both countries participate in 
sanctions through some sort of constraining dissensus, without actively trying to influence the 
discussion on sanctions regimes. This stance towards EU cooperation aligns with theory on 
the behavior of small states. As inclined in the definition of small states used in this study, 
both the Netherlands and Finland are not able to change the “basic contours” of the EU.263 In 
attempting to influence matters, mainly Finland shows attempts to make small changes in 
sanctions policy. However, both countries leave the eventual decision-making to the 
centralized level. Based on this case study, thus, small states cannot make major changes to 
the EU’s CFSP. They nevertheless go through a process of evaluating the domestic and 
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international impact of decisions. This means that small states are involved in the process of 
prolonging sanctions and maintain accountability for them as well. 
In short, both the Netherlands and Finland lean towards a supranational, 
neofunctionalist approach of European integration as it comes to continuing sanctions 
regimes. This does not necessarily mean that the centralized way of going about sanctions is 
cast in concrete. As postfunctionalist theory argues as well, centrally organized sanctions can 
lead to weaker preferences for integration domestically.264 Domestic parliamentary debates in 
both countries show that not all politicians are in favor of continuing the sanctions as before, 
which over time could lead to a change in the debate of continuing sanctions. Some 
politicians want their country to take a firmer position in EU sanctions discussions, which 
would lead to a disruption of the EU’s united stance. In the debates under study, however, the 
preference for a united EU and sticking to the Minsk agreement prevails. 
 
  
                                                     




By conducting a QCA on documents from Finnish and Dutch parliamentary debates in 2016, 
this thesis has shown how different EU countries participate in EU sanctions regimes. This 
research sets an important step forward in understanding the peculiarities of the mechanism 
that is part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the way it is perceived 
differently in each member state. This work is especially useful in getting a better view on 
smaller EU countries that rarely stand in the spotlights when EU matters are under discussion. 
The study has considered both the internal, domestic dynamics of sanctions regimes, as well 
as their impact on the participation of the Netherlands and Finland in the international sphere. 
 Considering the results of this QCA, it is safe to state that clear differences exist 
between countries in the way they deal with prolonging EU sanctions. Finnish and Dutch 
politicians do not consider the sanctions mechanism of the EU to be a tool of only one type of 
sanctions; different politicians argue for coercing, constraining, or signaling sanctions. 
Important in the differences between countries is their general stance towards a certain 
sanctions package. Coming to the foreground in this QCA is that Finnish politicians in 
general focus more on the negative impact on the sender of sanctions, in this case Finland. 
Dutch politicians focus more on the negative impact of sanctions on the receiver of EU 
sanctions, in this case Russia. This is explainable through the high degree of interdependence 
between Finland and Russia, making it less likely for Finland to actively support these 
sanctions. Dutch politicians wanting stricter sanctions, on the other hand, express more often 
new reasons for implementing certain sanctions, because of for example the war in Syria or 
the downing of flight MH-17. In a way, some politicians express themselves in line with the 
naïve theory by Galtung: they see reasons for stricter coercing sanctions, while the 
effectiveness of these particular sanctions is not completely clear. In general, several Dutch 
politicians are actively in favor of coercing and constraining types of sanctions, while no 
Finnish politicians express a desire to implement new sanctions of these types. 
 Despite differences, as the discussion section has shown, both countries generally 
support the prolonging of a similar type of signaling sanctions. These sanctions, which the 
whole EU supports, show disapproval of certain behavior. Reasons for supporting these 
sanctions are manifold. When considering domestic explanations, these reasons can develop 
through the idea that politicians want their country to do what is morally right. In upholding 
EU sanctions, different countries find prolonging sanctions important because they perceive it 
as the appropriate thing to do. These reasons are particularly logical when understanding that 
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the sanctions in place did not have the desired effect when they were implemented; whereas 
countries first had the expectation that the Minsk agreements could be reached, it was clear in 
2016 that this would not be the case.  
 Other important reasons for countries to prolong existing sanctions are, as can be 
concluded, the attributed importance of EU unity. Small countries in the EU do not see 
themselves as influential enough to change the general course of the EU. Instead, many 
politicians express it as important to avoid public disagreement with other EU countries, to 
make sure that the EU functions as one entity. In general, Finland and the Netherlands do not 
seem to actively interfere in EU decision-making on sanctions. When relating their behavior 
to European integration theories, the mechanisms working in both countries fit in 
postfunctionalist ideas of European integration. Both countries stress the importance of 
dealing with sanctions in a supranational manner, despite having domestic voices arguing 
otherwise. This stance means that it is not guaranteed that these countries always agree on 
sanctions in the future; below the surface, frustration and disagreement do exist. However, as 
this study underlines, the general way to go for small countries in the EU is to align 
themselves with the prevailing policy in the EU. The risks for becoming isolated are simply 
larger for smaller countries, causing that they are careful in having strongly differing 
opinions. In the EU, the sanctions mechanism is thus a tool that, once established, is not used 
by small countries as a way to enhance intergovernmentalism. Instead, it is a tool used to 
show EU unity. This unity, however, is in every country expressed in different ways. To 
understand how decisions on the CFSP are made, it is therefore important to study how small 
states participate in the CFSP. Small countries do not follow the EU blindly, and differ in the 
way they go about the EU’s foreign policy. 
Based on the conclusions in this work, future research on the role individual countries 
in EU sanctions regimes should consider several important issues. To get a better 
understanding of the differences within countries, party-specific behavior in sanctions 
discussions needs more consideration. This study made a distinction between governmental 
and opposition parties, but the differences within especially opposition parties can be 
enormous as well. Further research is also needed to understand the long-term dynamics of 
sanctions in particular countries, by comparing different years during which sanctions were 
under discussion. This type of research can also identify how domestic changes, such as a 
change of government, influence the positioning of countries towards sanctions. Finally, to 
better understand the implications of sanctions on countries, other domestic factors 
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influencing sanctions need to be researched. Besides the political sphere considered in this 
study, public opinion and business lobbies influence positions on sanctions as well. 
 All in all, this research shows that different countries in the EU participate in sanctions 
regimes in different ways. On some countries, such as Finland, sanctions have a strong 
influence in domestic matters. For several reasons, this makes that Finnish politicians 
generally attempt to find alternative ways to deal with them, which comprise keeping good 
bilateral relations with Russia and supporting domestic actors hit by the sanctions. Other 
countries have a completely different approach towards sanctions: the debates in the 
Netherlands, as shown in this study, focus on different topics related to sanctions. As a 
country less directly related to Russia, Dutch politicians more clearly show disapproval of 
Russian behavior. On top of the existing sanctions, some even want to implement stricter 
sanctions, while dialogue and diplomacy should take place through international institutions. 
However, in prolonging sanctions, the pressure of the EU as a whole and the idea to act 
morally right seem to prevail over domestic reasons to change sanctions in place. Rather than 
intervening in the unity of EU, countries look for other ways to deal with the existing 
situation. Small countries in the EU thus use sanctions as a tool to stand united, but clearly do 
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Appendix 1. Full coding frame with dimension and category 
definitions 
 
1. Sanctions continuation: do parliamentarians want the sanctions on Russia to continue? 
This dimension includes whether parliamentarians call for a specific type of sanctions or 
whether they just want “stricter sanctions”.  
a. Stricter: Willing to implement stricter sanctions compared to the existing 
situation 
i. Specific sanctions (for example clear preferences for coercing, 
constraining or signaling sanctions) 
ii. General/unclear sanctions (no specific sanctions)  
b. Continuation: willing to keep the current sanctions in place 
i. Explicitly in favor of the current sanctions (for example, when people 
say “we don’t want to lift the sanctions in place” or “we are in favor of 
the current package”) 
ii. Implicitly in favor of the current sanctions, denying stricter sanctions 
(i.e. “we are not in favor of a stricter package right now”) 
c. Lifting the sanctions that are in place, against the current package 
d. Indifferent / unclear in their opinion 
e. Other 
 
2. Scale/dealing with the sanctions: on what level (national or international) do 
parliamentarians express ways to deal with the EU sanctions? This dimension does not 
cover whether parliamentarians are in favor or against the sanctions, but rather covers on 
what level they want to find solutions for the sanctions that are currently in place. This 
dimension also covers what kind of actions parliamentarians want to have taken while the 
sanctions are still in place.  
a. National 
i. Discuss support for domestic actors that are hit by the sanctions 
ii. Dialogue & diplomacy: establish or continue bilateral relations 
(i.e. dialogue, diplomacy and trade relations) with the target country  
iii. Western compliance: Take measures to make the “Western” 




1. Dialogue & diplomacy: try to establish dialogue or through 
diplomacy 
2. Burden distribution: distribute the burden between 
countries more evenly 
3. Western compliance: Take measures to make the 
“Western” (Ukraine, EU) side comply 
4. Other 
ii. Other / unclear 




2. International agreements: follow or stress international 
agreements 
3. Other / unclear 
c. Both national and international / unclear 
 
 
3. Role in EU cooperation: what role do politicians want their country to play when 
sanctions are under discussion on the EU level? This dimension covers the 
behavior of the country within the international environment. It covers what role 
the parliamentarians see their countries play in EU integration. 
a. assertive (intergovernmental) 
i. block discussions on sanctions 
ii. support discussions on sanctions 
1. call for stricter sanctions 
2. call for keeping the current sanctions in place 
3. call for softer sanctions 
4. try to achieve other objectives related to sanctions 
b. reticent (supranational) 
i. Stressing the need for a united EU 
ii. Other 
 
4. Reasons for (coming closer to) lifting the sanctions: reasons parliamentarians 
give to (come closer to) lifting sanctions. This dimension covers both reasons that 
are important to the country as such, as well as reasons that parliamentarians 
attribute to a wider (i.e. EU) interest. When statements are included in this 
dimension, this does not necessarily mean that the parliamentarians want to lift the 
sanctions right away. If a statement notes “if this happens… then this…”, it is 
included in this dimension. This dimension also covers speculations about lifting 
sanctions in the future. 
a. Economic reasons (impact on trade possibilities existing before the 
sanctions, sanctions hitting certain countries in the EU more than others) 
b. Stressing the need for a united EU / other countries wanting to lift 
sanctions 
c. Minsk agreement 
i. Full implementation of Minsk II 
ii. Partial implementation of Minsk II 
d. General impact of current sanctions (duration, countersanctions, etc.) 
e. Ineffectiveness of sanctions 
f. Other 
 
5. Reasons for implementing new or upholding the existing sanctions: this 
dimension covers all statements that point towards parliamentarians wanting to 
keep the current sanctions in place, or support stricter sanctions. When 
parliamentarians state for example that they want to keep the sanctions in place 
because the Minsk agreement has not been fulfilled, they are part of this 
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dimension. When parliamentarians state that when the Minsk agreement is 
fulfilled sanctions can be lifted, they are part of dimension 4. This dimension also 
involves statements that want sanctions to stay in place when they are as a 
response to statements calling for stricter sanctions. 
a. Stricter sanctions 
i. New reasons for having sanctions (constraining) 
1. Involvement in the war in Syria 
2. MH17 
ii. Ineffectiveness or limited effect of current sanctions 
iii. Security concerns (concerns about security, so for that reason 
stricter sanctions) 
iv. Prevention of future escalations (signaling) 
b. Upholding existing sanctions: this category includes statements that are 
both against implementing stricter measures, as well as statements that are 
actively in favor of keeping the current measures in place.  
i. Strategic culture (attributing upholding sanctions to a perceived 
“national” way of dealing with such measures) 
ii. Minsk agreement (as reason to keep the sanctions) 
iii. Continued involvement in already existing conflicts 
1. Ukraine, Crimea (violation of international law, initial 
reason for the sanctions) 
2. MH17 
3. Other / unclear 
iv. Security concerns (concerns about security when lifting 
sanctions/making sanctions stricter) 
1. Domestic / EU concerns 
2. Concerns about other regions (Ukraine, other) 
v. Effectivity of current sanctions 
1. Counterproductive/ineffective: new sanctions as 
counterproductive or ineffective 
2. Other 
vi. Need for a united EU, concerns about EU unanimity when 





Appendix 2. Coding sheet containing first, second and final codes 
 
The coding sheet below consists of images of the full coding sheet, coded in Microsoft Excel. 
























Appendix 3. Units of coding including the final codes 
 
The units of coding including their final codes below are images of a file originating from 
Atlas.ti 9. The Finnish units of coding start with an eight (8), followed by the number of the 
unit. The Dutch units of coding start with a nine (9), followed by the number of the unit. A 
textual version is in possession of the author, and available upon request. 
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